Three Essays on the Economics of For-Profit Colleges by Shannon, Eric William
Three Essays on the Economics of For-Profit Colleges
By
Eric William Shannon
Submitted to the graduate degree program in School of Public Affairs and Administration and the
Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Committee members





Date defended: May 3, 2018
The Dissertation Committee for Eric William Shannon certifies
that this is the approved version of the following dissertation :
Three Essays on the Economics of For-Profit Colleges
Jacob T. Fowles, Chairperson
Date approved: May 10, 2018
ii
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three studies regarding the growing role of for-profit
colleges and universities in the United States. Analyzing the behaviors of these
institutions through a microeconomic lens, I investigate the ways in which the internal
and external environmental factors in which for-profit colleges and universities operate
influence their behaviors as well as impact on traditional colleges and universities.
The three separate research questions asked by this dissertation are all analyzed using
sophisticated quantitative econometric models.
The substantive conclusions of this dissertation is that many of the assumed behaviors
of for-profit colleges and universities – such as the predatory targeting of minority
communities – are not empirically realized. Additionally, this dissertation illustrates
that the competitive forces introduced by for-profit colleges and universities may lead
to positive increased in the efficiency of public institutions. For all three chapters,
practical policy recommendations are forwarded in order to promote evidence-based
policymaking as it relates to for-profit colleges and universities. Major empirical
contributions of this dissertation include one of the first applications of a novel
bias correction – the split-panel jackknife - to a substantive policy area as well
as a comparison and discussion of the quasi-experimental methodologies used by
researchers in applied policy analysis.
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“Policy analysts are not advancing a discipline, nor are they advancing a narrative of
human experience. Policy analysis methods are a means to the end of improving the
bases on which policies are made at all levels of government by raising uncomfortable
questions and putting in fresh ideas” - Lynn, 1999, p. 217.
1.0.1 For-Profit Colleges and Universities as a Policy Problem
In December 2016 alone, two for-profit colleges closed campuses across three states after
fraudulently using federal funds forcing approximately 10,000 students to transfer to a partner for-
profit college (Zamudio-Sauréz, 2016). Additionally, new analysis by the Department of Education
showed that when considering all federal revenue sources – and not just those received through the
Department of Education – the number of for-profit colleges and universities receiving at least 90%
of their revenue from federal sources increased 17 to 200 with additional revenue coming from the
Department of Defense as well as the Department of Veterans Affairs (Berman, 2016). Despite
claims from popular news sources that for-profit colleges and universities engage in predatory
business practices – such as providing students with inaccurate and misleading job placement
statistics – as well as calls from lawmakers for increased regulation of the sector, little systematic
knowledge exists regarding for-profit colleges and universities writ-large (Hensley-Clancy, 2016;
Holland & DeLuca, 2016).
Although one may be tempted to assume that the cases described above are isolated incidents
affecting a relatively small sector of the higher education landscape, the numbers tell a different
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Source: National Center for Educational Statistics/Author’s Calculation
story. As illustrated by Figure 1.1, for-profit colleges and universities experienced exponential
growth in student enrollments with the years 2011 and 2012 seeing peak enrollment.
Figure 1.1 also illustrates that beginning around 1998/1999, the enrollment growth experienced
by for-profit colleges and universities has been primarily in four-year institutions – a data trend that
dispels the notion of for-profit colleges and universities as primarily two-year institutions (Cellini,
2005). Compounding the growth in for-profit enrollments is the amount of money students are
borrowing to attend for-profit colleges and universities: although students believe the costs of for-
profit colleges and universities closely resembles that of public-two year colleges, the real tuition
costs are often closer to those at private, non-profit colleges (Kofoed, 2013). The rise in borrowing
costs coinciding with enrollment growth is found in Figure 1.2
As depicted in Figure 1.2, the institutions receiving the largest amount of student loans –
including federal as well as private loans – dramatically shifted between 2000 and 2014. Whereas
in 2010 only one out of the top ten institutions (in terms of student borrowing) was a for-profit
college or university, by 2014 eight out of the top ten institutions were for-profit colleges or
universities. Despite this growing role of for-profit colleges in the higher education landscape as
well as the broader economy, relatively little remains empirically known regarding the behaviors,
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Figure 1.2: Changes in Loans Received
Source: Looney & Yannelis (2015)
practices, as well as the impacts of for-profit colleges and universities. It is such a lack of empirical
evidence that motivates the central question of this dissertation: what are the internal and external
factors – both in terms of markets and policy – influencing the behaviors of for-profit colleges and
universities? This dissertation also attempts to expand on the existing literature by focusing on the
practical applications of the questions answered. Rather than interpreting the results as contributing
to a theoretical body of knowledge, it only considers the related literatures that help operationalize
and contextualize the results at hand while also developing a practical policy analysis. This
dissertation contends that without an objective understanding of the empirical realities of a policy
domain – in this case for-profit higher education – any future policies will be flawed.
The introduction proceed as a follows: I reintroduce the goal of the dissertation as well as its
place within the extant literature, lay out the conceptual framework and major assumptions used
throughout the dissertation, followed by short previews of the three studies laying out the main
research questions, methodological approaches, and results.
1.0.2 Goals and Place
The goal of this dissertation is to objectively and quantitatively speak to the growing concerns
and discussion surrounding for-profit colleges and universities which to this point have been
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addressed normatively, qualitatively, or largely ignored by the extant public administration research
(Anderson & Taggart, 2016). In order to accomplish this goal, this dissertation draws heavily
on microeconomic policy analysis and positive economics. By utilizing the tools provided by
these disciplines, this dissertation also attempts to remedy the lack of traditional policy analytic
techniques used by public administration scholars who are increasingly relying on post-positivist,
critical, and/or political science approaches to policy analysis. As opposed to critical and post-
positivist approaches to policy analysis – which often produce results of little utility in actually
evaluating the impact of specific policies or forecasting potential outcomes – and the political
science approach to policy analysis – which is far more concerned with understanding how
the policy process works – the techniques employed here seek to produce results with direct
implications for producing better polices as well as a deeper understanding of a specific policy
domain (Gormley, 2007; Nowlin, 2011).
One of the only public administration pieces explicitly addressing the for-profit higher
education sector, Anderson & Taggart (2016) use the for-profit sector as a means to analyze
the role of organizations in creating public value failures or the framework meant to supplement
the market failure framework used in traditional policy analysis (Bozeman, 2002). Although the
authors provide descriptive information regarding institutional expenditures and student financial
aid patterns across institutional sectors (e.g. public, non-profit, for-profit) a majority of the authors’
time is spent on describing the drivers of public value failure and not the operations of for-profit
colleges and universities. Given the purpose of this dissertation to move discussions of the for-
profit beyond the nebulous, this line of research offers relatively little utility in the framing of each
study.1
Looking toward the policy analysis as well as traditional higher education policy literature,
those studies empirically examining for-profit colleges and universities, focus primarily on student
labor market outcomes; a body of literature that has not yet reached a consensus on the degree
to which for-profit colleges lead to better labor market outcomes than their public or non-profit
1This is not to say that this literature is of little utility writ-large but rather for the purposes of the present study in
being a piece of applied policy analytic research.
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counterparts (Cellini & Chaudhary, 2014; Cellini & Turner, 2016). As noted by Jaquette &
Parra (2016): “Policymakers have been concerned about the behavior of for-profit institutions for
decades...[yet] longitudinal analysis of the behavior of for-profit institutions remain rare” (647).
This is not to say, however, that insights are not gleaned from the bodies of literature examining
labor market outcomes and college choice decisions: both bodies of literature provide insights into
how for-profit colleges and universities introduce the threat of competition and the possibility of a
market into the higher education landscape.
The extent to which competition in higher education operates in practice remains a disputed
empirical and theoretical question. While some researchers suggest that the conditions necessary
to generate a competitive market of higher education are a heuristic analogous to the Weberian
concept of bureaucracy, others maintain that for better or worse competition – or the threat of
competition – determines an institution’s capacity to generate the revenue needed to survive
(Zemsky et al., 2001).2 The literatures on labor market outcomes as well as college choice,
however, provide evidence for the latter. For example, in examining the determinants of college
choice Chung (2012) finds that even when a student’s enrollment decision is driven by a complex
set of factors, the selection of a for-profit is due in-part to the concentration of for-profits within
the student’s local market. While this finding will be built upon in study two – which illustrates
the importance of concentration in the market decisions of FPCUs – it is also in line with Long
(2004)’s seminal work on college choice which finds that competition faced by public systems and
the competitiveness of the public systems themselves influence student choice. Specifically, Long
finds that an increase in the market share of public institutions – in terms of expenditures – leads
to an increased probability of a student enrolling at an in-state public institution.3
As can be gleaned from the discussion above, this dissertation is assuming that competition
with higher education takes a specific form. And it is this conceptualization of competition that
lays the foundational assumptions for the empirical aspects of the following studies.
2Study one provides a review of the relevant studies for operationalizing and conceptualizing markets in higher
education
3The utility function presented in Long (2004) is a widely accepted operationalization of student behavior and is
discussed in more details in both study one and three.
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1.0.3 Conceptual Framework
Although the following framework will be modified and discussed in details in each of the
following chapters, the basic assumption underlying all three chapters is that each student (i) is
choosing an institution (j) that maximizes their expected utility from attending that institution:
Ui j = f (Pi j,A j,Di j,Xi,Z j) (1.1)
Where each institution is characterized by their out-of-pocket price paid by student Pi j, an
institution’s academic quality and program offerings (A j), distance to the school (Di j), and a
vector of student (Xi) and institution characteristics (Z j).4 From a microeconomic perspective,
in order for a for-profit college or university to compete with other institutions, they must simply
represent the possibility of increasing one of the terms in the utility function above more than
other institutions in a student’s choice set (Paulsen & Toutkoushian, 2008). The utility function
outlined above also outlines the contributions, as well as limitations, of drawing on related bodies
of literature in examining markets in higher education.
Describing the empirical challenge faced by researchers studying competition in education,
Linick (2014) states the following:
There are many well-executed, rigorous studies of the effects of market-based reforms;
however, whether these studies capture the effects of competition and not simply the
effects of choice, autonomy, or policy-specific context is not clear. (3)
Within Linick’s statement is the assumption that any measure of competition is not capturing
competition but rather proximity. Such an assumption, however, is coming from a theoretical
viewpoint that requires actual competition to take place in order to influence the behavior of
other institutions within a market. This theoretical viewpoint is refuted on several fronts.
Empirically, Cellini (2009) provides causal evidence of competition – through the use of a
regression discontinuity design – that when community colleges receive additional public support
4Adapted from: Cellini et al. (2016); Long (2004)
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in the form of funding and media coverage, students who previously enrolled in a for-profit college
or university transfer to community colleges. Theoretically – as well as empirically – Bridgman
et al. (2008) provide a review of findings that the mere threat of competition leads to changes
in behavior from the public sector. In their own empirical analysis analyzing changes in the
Brazilian oil industry following the removal of government enforced trade barriers, the authors
conclude: “Studies [just] using market share data will miss threats of competition, which can have
real effects” (p. 26).
At the most basic level – even if skeptics do not buy into the arguments above – it can be
assumed that competition exists within higher education by adopting the view of the current
policy dictating the use of federal financial aid. Specifically, the 1972 Reauthorization of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 shifted financial aid to the hands of the students – allowing
students to “shop” for an institution of their choice given the utility function specified above.
The government’s assumption regarding the use of financial aid combined with the growing role
of for-profit colleges and universities make this dissertation timely and important: given that the
political and policy environment assume a competitive marketplace in higher education, what is
the evolving role of for-profit colleges and universities in this assumption?
1.0.4 Overview of Dissertation
One of the primary purposes of this dissertation is the utilization of sophisticated yet appropriated
econometric techniques in the analysis of public policy issues which are often over politicized.
In the current context this is the evolving role of for-profit colleges and universities in a higher
education environment which is assumed to achieve allocative efficiency through the competitive
pressures including but not limited to alternative services in the form of for-profit colleges and
universities. Each of the three studies presented here attempt to remedy this oversight by providing
a scientific analysis of the assumed behaviors of the for-profit sector.
Study one The Effect of For-Profit Colleges and Universities on the Public Sector: a Stochastic
Frontier Analysis, represents an empirical examination of the response of public community
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colleges to the entry of for-profit colleges and universities into local education markets. Utilizing
panel data from the State of Ohio, study one models this relationship using Stochastic Frontier
Analysis and a Generalized Estimating technique. Whereas Stochastic Frontier Analysis allows
for an explicit examination of changes in the efficiency of community colleges when faced with
competition from a for-profit college or university, the Generalized Estimating Equation technique
addresses whether differences in efficiency lead to differences in organizational productivity
while also appropriately accounting for the organizational inertia commonly found in public
organizations. Leveraging the exogenous geographic conditions of the Marcellus Shale to improve
identification of causal effects, study one ultimately shows that while competition from for-profit
colleges and universities increases the efficiency of community colleges, this efficiency may lead
to decreases or have no effect on the productivity of community colleges.
The second study, Modeling For-Profit College Entry and Exit: an Application of the Split-
Panel Jackknife, examines the supply decisions of for-profit colleges and universities. One of
the first studies to empirically examine the location decisions of institutions as opposed to the
enrollment decisions of students, study one applies a novel discrete choice estimator to a panel
dataset of counties across the United States. By applying the split-panel jackknife, study one not
only explicitly addresses the assumption of predatory for-profit college behaviors but also provides
policy analysts with a potential tool in their methodological toolbox. Finding that for-profit college
and university supply decisions are a function of local market structures and economic conditions
– as opposed to the demographic characteristics of the market – study two holds direct implications
for any future policies regarding the regulation of for-profit colleges and universities into a local
market.
Study three, Information Disclosure Policies as Policy Instruments: a Comparison of Methods,
addresses the growing topic of for-profit college and university accountability by comparing the
differential responses of for-profit and non-profit colleges to an information disclosure policy
implemented by the United States Department of Education. Additionally, study three also
addresses any potential endogeneity by employing three separate treatment effect estimators to
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address the nonrandom differences between institutional types, allowing for robust empirical
estimates while also appropriately addressing issues of endogeneity that are often ignored or
addressed incorrectly in the extant public administration research. Study three provides evidence
regarding both the impact of regulations on postsecondary institutions but also the incentives built
into differing policy instrument designs.
The dissertation concludes with a summary of the findings of all three studies, followed by
limitations of the results and directions for future research before closing on the contributions of
the dissertation as a whole.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of For-Profit Colleges and Universities on the Public
Sector: a Stochastic Frontier Analysis
2.1 Introduction
With an estimated 7,550 for-profit colleges and universities (FPCUs) enrolling 2.5 million
students and costing taxpayers $100 billion annually, little research has systematically examined
the for-profit sector outside of labor market returns (Cellini, 2012; Cellini & Goldin, 2014).
Furthermore, despite the substantial overlap between FPCUs and public two-year colleges in
terms of program offerings and degree production, little is known about the relationship between
the two sectors (Bailey et al., 2001; Cellini, 2005). Given that FPCUs advertise themselves as
alternatives to struggling public institutions – and the prevailing notion of competition leading
to a more efficient production of public goods and services – the purpose of this study is to
build a deeper understanding of the relationship between community colleges and their for-
profit counterparts while also speaking to the larger discussion surrounding competition in the
public sector. Specifically, this study answers the following research question: when faced with
competitive pressures – in the form of a for-profit college or university – do public institutions
– in the form of community colleges – respond in terms of efficiency and productivity? To
answer this question, I briefly discuss the theoretical expectations of markets in education,
operationalize measures of competition and quantitatively analyze the response of community
colleges to increased competition in the form of FPCU market entry.
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2.2 Markets in Higher Education
Gaining prominence in 1972 with the amendment of the Higher Education Act of 1965 – which
shifted financial aid to students rather than institutions – the market model of higher education
casts students in the role of consumers (Dill, 1997). First, the provision of financial aid directly to
students – as opposed to institutions – incentivizes institutions to adapt to the needs of students and
therefore provide a more efficient education (Rothschild & White, 1993). Second, the dispersion of
financial aid directly to students equalizes the opportunity for all students to attend the institutions
of their choosing – an opportunity which will eventually equalize economic opportunities in the
form of labor market outcomes (Leslie & Johnson, 1974). The extent to which the market model
of higher education operates in practice, however, remains a disputed empirical question (Zemsky
et al., 2001).
Acting as both consumers of and inputs into institutions if higher education, the degree to which
students possess enough information to calculate the costs and benefits of attending one institution
over another may be limited (Gurantz, 2015). Because of this less-than-perfect information,
students may have differential responses to tuition prices and financial aid information: whereas
minority students may choose not to enroll in an institution due to a higher sticker price, white
students may view tuition increases as evidence of a higher quality product (Heller, 1997; Hoxby,
1997; Perna, 2006). In the context of the two-year sector, students may self-select into FPCUs
despite a higher sticker price due to the perceived lower opportunity costs of attending an FPCU:
FPCUs provide applicants and potential students with assistance on financial aid applications
while also streamlining the processes often associated with red-tape in public institutions (Iloh &
Tierney, 2014; Stephan et al., 2009). In addition to spending more on academic, institutional, and
student support than their public counterparts, FPCUs also aggressively advertise themselves as
providing a flexible alternative to the rigid bureaucracy of public institutions (Cellini, 2005; Cellini
& Chaudhary, 2014). While the advertising ability of for-profits may cause community colleges
to be overlooked by students in the search process (see: Iloh & Tierney, 2014), such advertising
practices also suggest that FPCUs are competing with community colleges on a geographic- and/or
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product space dimension. Whereas prestigious colleges and universities compete in a nationwide
market, less prestigious colleges and universities often compete on a regional basis (De Fraja &
Iossa, 2002; Hoxby, 1997; Rothschild & White, 1993). The question of the ways in which FPCUs
and community colleges compete, however, remains answered (Cellini, 2009; Sav, 2012).
Returning to the basic assumption of this dissertation – as discussed in the introduction – this
study assumes the following: each student (i) will choose the the institution (j) in market (m) that
maximizes their expected utility from attending each institution (Ui j):
Ui j = f (Pi j,A j,Di j,Xi,Z j)
where an individual student’s expected utility is a function of the expected out of price paid
by a student (Pi j), an institution’s academic quality and program offerings A j, distance to the
school (Di j), and a vector of student (Xi) and institution characteristics (Z j) (Cellini et al., 2016;
Long, 2004). Therefore, institutions – in order to survive – must signal to students an expected
increase in utility along at least one of these dimensions (Agasisti, 2009). Although competition
for specific – and often prestigious – schools can be reputational, competition among schools is
often a function of the local market structure allowing for the possibility of utility-maximizing
firms, such as FPCUs, attempting to maximize a student’s utility by focusing on the distance term
(D) in the utility function above (Gu, 2013). The extant research on education markets, however,
has produced mixed evidence regarding the degree to which competition exists.
Adopting a game theoretical lens, Gu (2013) contends that the extant literature examining
tuition costs of colleges and universities often overlooks the influence of geographical neighbors.
Attempting to capture competitive effects through the inclusion of a spatially lagged dependent
variable, Gufocuses more on the spatial autocorrelation between neighbor’s tuition levels as
opposed to how the possibility of competition may impact the other aspects of an institution’s
operation. Likewise, Gonzalez Canche (2014) also focuses on the impact competitive forces may
have on the changes in an institution’s tuition. Similar to Gu, Gonzalez Canche also operationalizes
competition as a series of lagged variables – such as tuition and non-resident student enrollments –
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within a range varying from 1 kilometer to 400 miles. While finding that evidence of competition in
the form of institution i’s neighbors’ non-resident enrollment decreasing non-resident tuition levels
at institution i, Gonzalez Canche also is indifferent to the sectoral differences of institutions: an
oversight – which as chapter two of this dissertation suggests – may be the driver of differences in
tuition. Utilizing a similar spatial approach, Misra et al. (2012) take Gonzalez Canche’s design one
step further by explicitly examining the impact of private schools on the efficiency of public schools
across various levels of schooling. Although the authors do find that increased competition from
private schools increases the technical efficiency of both public primary and secondary schools,
they also note “a proper definition of a market is needed” (p. 1189). A note which emphasizes
the possibility that the lack of consensus regarding the operationalization of competition and
markets used by researchers. Despite a conceptually consistent definition, operationalizations of
competition include but are not limited to: the number of institutions within a county (Cellini,
2009); distance to the nearest competitor (Greene & Kang, 2004), the number of competitors within
a specific mile-radius (McMillen et al., 2007); or the inclusion of several operationalizations within
the same empirical model (Linick, 2014).
This study contributes to the literature by (1) exploring the under examined two-year post-
secondary sector, (2) quantitatively evaluating whether increased competition leads to increased
performance and efficiency in public institutions, and (3) employing novel estimation techniques
to answer the question at hand.
2.3 Data and Methods
Drawing on microeconomic concepts of the firm, this study uses stochastic frontier analysis
(SFA) to measure the relationship between increased competition and technical efficiency – or
the ratio of a community college’s mean production to the corresponding mean production if a
community college utilized its expenditures most efficiently (Battese & Coelli, 1992). Associated
with concepts of the education production function, SFA also allows for an examination of whether
inefficiency may moderate the impact of educational expenditures on improving organizational
13
performance (Grosskopf et al., 2014). Stated differently: whereas ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression estimates the relationship between predicators and the dependent variable for the typical
or average observations, SFA estimates the relationship between predicators and the dependent
variable for the most efficient observation. For illustrative purposes Eq. (2.1) represents the basic
cross-section production function:
yi = α +βxi +νi −µi (2.1)
where yi represents a variable of interest for institution i, β are parameters to be estimated, xi
are the explanatory variables, vi is the idiosyncratic error term, and µi is a non-negative inefficiency
term for institution i. In the instance that there is no inefficiency in the error term the OLS estimator
will be unbiased, otherwise the SFA estimator is appropriate (Kirjavainen, 2012).
To examine the relationship between competition and performance, this study utilizes to two
measures: 1) the total enrollment of an institution in a given academic year and 2) the number
of degrees awarded in a given academic year and 2) the number of degrees warded in a given
academic year. Acknowledging the limitations of defining performance in terms of an input as
well as an output – as opposed to a true outcome – these measures are adopted for two reasons.
First, despite criticisms of output measures of performance, those holding institutions accountable
– such as governments and potential students – are looking for a simple quantitative measure of
performance (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). Second, microeconomic theory suggests that not only
will competition increase performance in public sector organizations but such increases will be
done efficiently (Carpenter II & Noller, 2010; Gronberg et al., 2016). Whereas degree production
measures the extent to which institutions are performing, postsecondary institutions must also
compete for enrollments: it is only after crossing an enrollment threshold that institutions concern
themselves with performance (Winston, 1999). Therefore, the use of degree production as an
outcome measure – in conjunction with SFA – allows for an examination of the degree to which
competition leads to efficiency in the public sector. Variance within this efficiency and the impact
of efficiency on productivity then requires explanation.
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2.3.1 Data Sources
Public two-year postsecondary institutions in the State of Ohio are the primary unit of analysis for
this study. Because of the programmatic characteristics and course offerings shared by community
colleges and FPCUs, this analysis excludes all four-year public and private non-profit institutions.
The Ohio Department of Education provides institution specific degree production information and
the Delta Cost Project provides data regarding institution-specific finances and institution controls
that were unavailable through the Ohio Department of Education. The final panel consists of 20
community colleges from 2000 to 2013 resulting in a possible 260 observations. The findings
reported include descriptive statistics, stochastic frontier estimates, and the results of a generalized
estimating equation (GEE) technique analyzing the relationship between efficiency and degree
production.
2.3.2 Selection of Variables and Measurement
As mentioned, the variables of interest are the total enrollment as well as the degree count for
two-year public institutions in the State of Ohio. Both degree counts and total enrollment are
expected to be a function of several organization factors as suggested by microeconomic theory: a
commonality made possible by the “customer-input technology” through which higher education
is produced. Stated differently: those students who enroll in a specific institution also supply the
institution with one of its primary inputs, an input which attracts additional students of a similar
background (Rothschild & White, 1993). Drawing on this conceptual framework, the selected
predictor variables can be categorized as discretionary inputs and non-discretionary inputs.
Discretionary inputs – or those under the control of an institution – are traditionally expenditure
measures. Under microeconomic theory, an increase in expenditures should lead to increased
productivity and performance in educational organizations (Monk, 1989; Webber & Ehrenberg,
2010). As such, the following expenditure measures are included as predictors: academic support,
institutional support, instructional support, operations/maintenance, and student services. Despite
the focus of much education policy research on the impact of discretionary inputs on performance
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and productivity, the degree to which expenditures alone enhance productivity is limited due to the
moderating role of non-discretionary inputs or environmental factors (Monk, 1992). Put simply:
a purely economic model does not control for institutional characteristics that may influence both
degree production as well as enrollment patterns such as percent of students who ethnic/racial
minorities.
In terms of enrollment patterns of community colleges, while higher education institutions
often possess some autonomy in the characteristics of the students they admit, community colleges
– including those in Ohio – have open enrollment policies. As such, a community college’s
primary input – students – is a function of an institution’s geographic location as opposed to
admission decisions or processes (Crouse, 2015). Additionally, while there is relatively little
known regarding the instructional workforce of community colleges, the hiring practices of less-
selective institutions – such as community colleges – are often a function of the local labor
market as well (Eagan, 2007). Likewise, recent research also notes that exposure to part-time
faculty – often overrepresented at community colleges – results in decreased likelihood of student
completion (Jaeger & Eagan, 2011). In order to account for the impact of faculty on both an
institution’s efficiency and productivity, I control for the total number of part-time faculty at an
institution. Aside from the aforementioned non-discretionary inputs, such as students and faculty,
I also account for competitive forces. Table 2.1 displays summary statistics.
2.3.3 Operationalizing Competition
Since the present analysis focuses on community colleges – which are often county-based I follow
convention and define a market as a county (Cellini, 2009, 2010). Additionally, it is assumed
that students do not attend community colleges outside of their home county due to the rising
monetary costs associated with doing so without a corresponding increase in institutional prestige
or convenience. Due to the inconsistencies in the operationalization of competition in the extant
literature and the pursuit of robust estimates of competition, I operationalizing competition in three
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
M SD Min Max
Ln (Enroll) 8.35 0.78 7.13 10.34
Ln (AcadSupp) 6.01 0.57 4.59 7.46
Ln (InstSupp) 7.01 0.36 6.09 8.30
Ln (Instruction) 7.90 0.27 7.24 8.65
Ln (Operations) 6.22 0.36 4.91 7.42
Ln (StudServ) 6.42 0.38 5.63 8.19
HHI 0.92 0.13 0.53 1.00
FPs 1.18 2.46 0.00 11.00
FP Dummy 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Ln (PTEnroll) 7.69 0.93 5.97 9.81
Ln (BlackEnroll) 5.49 1.51 2.56 8.91
Ln (HispEnroll) 3.91 1.37 0.00 6.98
Ln (PTFac) 5.26 0.92 0.00 7.25
Observations 202
ways. First, I employ a widely-used measure of market concentration: a Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) that measures the extent to which a single community college has a strong hold over
the market share of enrollments within a county. Calculated by the equation presented in Eq. (2.2),
the HHI is a bounded measure that takes on a value of 0 if perfect competition exists within a








Second, I include a variable indicating the number of FPCUs operating within a college’s
county in a given year. Third, I include a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 to indicate
whether there are any for-profit institutions operating within a community college’s county in a
given year and 0 otherwise. Following the estimation of the models, the coefficients on these
variables will allow for an assessment of the degree to which presence or intensity of competition
has a stronger impact on performance and efficiency. In order to provide a better understanding
of the locations of community colleges as well as FPCUs, Figure 1 presents the geographic
distribution of the sample used in the analysis.
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Figure 2.1: Visual Representation of Sample
As illustrated by Figure 1, FPCUs (orange points) are more common than community colleges
(blue points), but do at first glance appear to cluster around the community colleges. Figure 1 also
raises the possibility of cross-state-border competition: as several community colleges are located
near state borders. While acknowledging the potential of cross-state competition to inflate the
estimates of competition, addressing such competition is beyond the scope of the present study.
2.3.3.1 Addressing Endogeneity
As will be illustrated by the remaining studies of this dissertation, it is most likely the case that
locations of FPCUs is not exogenous. In order to address any potential bias introduced into the
models by the endogenous location decisions of FPCUs, I adopt a two-stage residual inclusion
strategy (2SRI). As opposed to the popular two-stage least squares estimator (2SLS) utilized in
a linear context where the predicted values for an endogenous variable replace the endogenous
variable in the second stage of the model, 2SRI includes the first-stage residuals within the second
stage of the model. In the present context the 2SRI estimator is preferable given the properties of
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the endogenous variables.
As with the 2SLS estimator, the 2SRI estimator requires the presence of a variable that is
likely to influence the endogenous variable while being exogenous to the error term (Basu et al.,
2017; Cellini, 2008; Terza et al., 2008). In the present context the instrument that was selected
was whether or not a county was situated on the Marcellus shale; while there are contradicting
directional relationships between whether a FPCU has greater or less incentive to enter into
these counties, the purpose of this instrument is to simply purge endogeneity from the empirical
estimates not the direction of the instrument itself. All three measures of competition were
instrumented using the binary ’shale’ variable and the subsequent residual term was included in
all models. Table 2.2 presents the first-stage estimates.
Table 2.2: First Stage Results
HHI Intensity Presence
Shale 3.069∗∗∗ (14.989) -12.556∗∗∗ (-23.869) -4.143∗∗∗ (-11.107)
Observations 202 202 202
t-statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.3.4 Data Analysis and Results
This study involves two estimating techniques: stochastic frontier analyses (SFA) as well as
generalized estimating equations (GEE). The first – SFA – is used to estimate the technical
efficiency of community colleges and can be represented by the following equation:
ln(enrollment)it = β0 +β1ln(AcadSupp)it +β2ln(InstSupp)it +β3ln(Instruct)it+
β4ln(Operations)it +β5ln(StudServ)it +νit −µit (2.3)
where i and t index individual community colleges and academic years respectively, β s are
estimable parameters; νit is a two-sided term representing random error; µit is a non-negative
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random variable representing inefficiency assumed to be a function of a set of explanatory non-
discretionary inputs, therefore the inefficiency term can be expressed in reduced form as follows:
µit = δ0+δ1ln(ptenroll)it +δ3ln(blackenroll)+δ2ln(hispenroll)it +δ3ln(pt f ac)it +δ4(competition)it
(2.4)
It is assumed that µ has a distribution that can be characterized as half-normal and is
independent of ν . Additionally, it is assumed that the production function of community colleges
takes a Cobb-Douglas functional form, although additional flexible forms were tested – such as the
translog functional form – these models resulted in severe multicollinearity. Both the frontier
coefficients (β ) and inefficiency parameters (δ ) are estimated simultaneously via maximum-
likelihood in order to avoid the inconsistency problems of a two-stage approach (Diaz & Sanchez,
2008; Wang, 2002). The results of the specified stochastic frontier models are presented in Table
2.3.
Starting with the model where competition is operationalized as the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index, all of the input variables are shown to have a statistically significant effect. Whereas
increased levels of instructional and operational spending increase the frontier for student
enrollments, increased levels of all other expenditure enrollments are not statistically significant
in changing the frontiers for student enrollments. There was, however, a statistically significant
relationship between a county’s market structure – as captured by the HHI – and the efficiency
of a community college as it relates to enrollments. Specifically, the HHI model illustrates that
as a community college’s market share of enrollments increases, their efficiency in producing
enrollments decreases.1
Continuing on to the model where competition is operationalized as the number of FPCUs
within a county, there are fewer statistically significant input variables but both the AIC and
BIC suggest a relatively better fitting model than the previous model where competition was
1In measuring technical efficiency, positive coefficients represent increased inefficiency or decreased efficiency.
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Table 2.3: Stochastic Frontier Estimates
HHI Intensity Presence
Ln (AcadSupp) -0.178∗ (0.107) -0.233 (0.240) -0.189∗∗ (0.095)
Ln (InstSupp) -1.101∗∗∗ (0.120) -1.058∗∗∗ (0.182) -1.123∗∗∗ (0.138)
Ln (Instruction) 1.169∗∗ (0.554) 1.478 (1.085) 0.997 (0.625)
Ln (Operations) 0.293∗∗∗ (0.098) 0.251 (0.212) 0.299∗∗∗ (0.091)
Ln (StudServ) -0.370∗∗ (0.174) -0.444∗ (0.251) -0.329 (0.213)
Constant 9.011∗∗∗ (3.458) 7.439 (5.399) 10.233∗∗ (4.281)
lnsig2v
Constant -1.987∗∗∗ (0.302) -2.346 (1.446) -1.869∗∗∗ (0.259)
lnsig2u
Competition 15.708∗∗ (7.994) -1.494∗∗∗ (0.460) -3.628 (2.769)
First Stage Residual -5.688 (9.766) 0.260 (0.856) 2.166 (3.038)
Ln (PTEnroll) -1.094 (0.769) -1.181∗ (0.629) -0.992 (1.081)
Ln (BlackEnroll) -0.238 (0.145) -0.187 (0.133) -0.273∗ (0.148)
Ln (HispEnroll) 0.141 (0.231) 0.215∗ (0.117) 0.154 (0.259)
Ln (PTFac) -0.339∗ (0.188) -0.240 (0.302) -0.270∗ (0.151)
Constant -5.741 (11.880) 9.876∗∗ (4.384) 9.074 (6.863)
N 202.000 202.000 202.000
AIC 302.928 296.477 303.947
BIC 349.243 342.792 350.263
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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operationalized as the HHI. As with the HHI model, there is a statistically significant relationship
between competition and the efficiency of community college’s in terms of producing student
enrollments: an increase in the number of for-profits within a county increases the efficiency of
community college enrollments. Finally, the model operationalizing competition as a dummy
variable indicating the presence of any FPCU in a county displays no statistically meaningful
relationship between competition and efficiency. Of the three models, however, the presence
model has the worst relative model fit as indicated by the AIC and BIC values. Whereas the
SFA model addressed the first research question of whether competition from FPCUs increased
the efficiency of community colleges, the second research question of whether any efficiency gains
due to competition lead to increased productivity in community colleges remains unanswered.
In order to explore the relationship between efficiency and degree production, I utilize an
AR(1) population-averaged generalized estimating equation technique, which controls for first-
order correlation in the error term of cross-sectional time-series data (Zorn, 2010). A marginal
model, GEEs offer an attractive alternative to conditional approaches – such as fixed effects – for
the topic at hand. First, while GEEs require the specification of the correlation structure of the data,
GEEs are also robust to structural misspecification (Ballinger, 2004; Zorn, 2006). Therefore, while
the persistence of inefficiency and lag in productivity gains gives reason to suspect that institutions
are correlated within clusters over time – justifying the specification of an AR(1) process – there is
little risk in specifying an AR(1) process over another correlation structure (Cui & Quian, 2007).
Second, as a marginal approach, GEEs allow us to examine the average effect of efficiency and
competition on degree production across the entire population of community colleges as opposed
to within specific institutions as is the case with fixed-effect approaches (Gardiner et al., 2009).
Third, the GEE approach is preferable to a random effects approach given the interest in the average
effects of the covariates of interest not in effect of average effects on individual units. As such, I
estimate the following equation:
ln(degreecount)it = α0 +α1COMPit +α2EFFit +α3Xit + εit (2.5)
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where i and t index individual community colleges and academic years respectively; COMP is
a measure of competition; EFF is a community colleges efficiency score in a given academic year;
X is a vector of institutional controls; and εit is the error term which follows an AR(1) process and
takes the following form:
εit = ρεt−1 +ωt (2.6)
In order to account for organizational inertia an AR(1) error term was used in place of a lagged
dependent variable ln(degreecount)it−1 for two reasons. First, the AR(1) process gives the lowest
variance (e.g. most efficient) estimates for a given amount of data. Second – and pragmatically —
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable leads to a suppression of statistical power of the other
independent variables in the model (Achen, 2001). Given the interest of the current analysis in the
estimates on EFF and COMP an AR(1) process in the error term is preferred while still accounting
for the inertial behaviors of community colleges.2
The utility of the specified GEE model is the inclusion of the EFF term which allows for
an examination of whether a community college’s efficiency contributes to degree production.
Ranging from 0 to 1, each institution’s efficiency score was produced by the preceding stochastic
frontier analysis and represents the degree to which an institution is operating in terms of technical
inefficiency with 0 illustrating complete inefficiency and 1 illustrating perfect technical efficiency.
A visual representation of the efficiency scores for each institution over time is presented in Figure
2.
As illustrated by Figure 2, there is substantial variation between and within institutions in terms
of technical efficiency, such differences allow any estimator to capture the statistical relationship
between efficiency and productivity if the relationship exists. The results of the GEE specification
are found in Table 2.4.
Across all three sets of GEE estimates, only the model operationalizing competition as the
presence of a FPCU in a county finds that as a college’s efficiency in enrollments increases, an
2The role of statistical power is even more important in the present context where n is small.
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institution’s degree production decreases. Given the heavy weighting of enrollment in funding
formulas for higher education institutions, both the lack of relationship between efficiency
and productivity as well as the negative relationship between efficiency and productive is not
unexpected: in the absence of outcomes-based performance funding, institutions have a greater
incentive to increase enrollments than to increase degree production (Hillman et al., 2014, 2015;
Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014). This statement is additionally supported by the significant on the
competition coefficient in model operationalizing competition as the HHI: in the instances where
a community college’s share of the market becomes more monopolistic, community colleges have
less incentive to increase degree production. Across all three models spending on instruction is
significantly and positively related to increases in degree production, suggesting that only those
expenditures directly concerning student academic performance may lead to increased degree
production (Ryan, 2004).
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Table 2.4: AR(1) GEE Estimates
HHI Intensity Presence
Efficiency -0.265 (0.364) -0.195 (0.353) -0.785∗∗ (0.358)
Competition -0.995∗ (0.520) 0.027 (0.064) 0.218 (0.204)
First Stage Residual 0.416 (0.452) -0.004 (0.054) -0.144 (0.134)
Ln (AcadSupp) 0.084 (0.072) 0.091 (0.074) 0.100 (0.064)
Ln (InstSupp) 0.108 (0.146) 0.125 (0.141) 0.268∗∗ (0.109)
Ln (Instruction) 0.353∗∗ (0.155) 0.388∗∗ (0.185) 0.262∗ (0.154)
Ln (Operations) -0.021 (0.055) -0.014 (0.053) -0.043 (0.053)
Ln (StudServ) 0.011 (0.075) 0.006 (0.076) 0.054 (0.074)
Ln (Enroll) 1.410 (1.143) 1.323 (1.085) 1.819∗ (1.068)
Ln (Enroll) × Ln (Enroll) -0.050 (0.064) -0.043 (0.062) -0.066 (0.059)
Ln (PTEnroll) 0.089 (0.116) 0.112 (0.101) 0.139 (0.120)
Ln (BlackEnroll) -0.037 (0.065) -0.046 (0.060) -0.035 (0.065)
Ln (HispEnroll) 0.065 (0.045) 0.064 (0.046) 0.062 (0.050)
Ln (PTFac) 0.032 (0.070) 0.027 (0.074) 0.039 (0.078)
Constant -5.989 (5.679) -7.293 (5.075) -9.977∗∗ (4.703)
N 185.000 185.000 185.000
χ2 205.208 90.745 254.191
Bootstrapped standard errors (1000 reps) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to examine the degree to which competition from for-profit colleges
and universities influences the efficiency and productivity of community colleges. Results indicate
that competition – in the form of FPCUs – does increase the efficiency of community but these
efficiency gains do not translate into gains on degree production. This finding is particularly
relevant given the prevailing rhetoric surrounding the idea of a competitive market in higher
education.
With microeconomic theory suggesting that competition will lead to increase efficiency – and
many government interventions justified on the basis of increasing allocative efficiency – the results
presented suggest the possibility of a higher education market in the two-year sector (Misra et al.,
2012; Vining & Boardman, 1992; Vining & Weimer, 1988). In the absence of such competition,
community colleges are monopolistic providers that may lead to welfare losses - a notion supported
by the coefficients for HHI in both the SFA and GEE estimates (Seim & Waldfogel, 2010). Not
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only does an increase in the market share of a community college lead to a decrease in technical
efficiency, the empirical estimates also find support for the positive effects of competition with
the number of FPCU competitors leading to efficiency gains in community colleges. The positive
effect of competition on efficiency, however, may not necessarily capture the degree to which a
FPCU and community college are actually competing for resources in the form of students but
rather a community college reacting to the presence of competitors. Conceptually, this behavior
aligns with a microeconomic framework: regardless of whether FPCUs are in actuality draining
resources from community colleges, institutions may react to the mere threat of competition
(Bridgman et al., 2008).
Whereas the SFA estimates provide evidence regarding the positive effects of competition
– and the negative effects of monopoly – on the efficiency of community colleges, the GEE
estimates illustrate that such efficiency may have either no impact of a negative impact on degree
production. Although this may appear counterintuitive to some, such a relationship speaks to the
larger discussions surrounding the rationale for performance-based funding policies in both public
two- and four-year institutions: whereas traditional funding formulas were heavily weighed by
inputs (e.g. enrollment), performance-based funding seeks to incentivize institutions to improve
outcomes (e.g. degree production) in order to receive state appropriations (Dougherty et al., 2016).
Given that Ohio did not implement performance-based funding for public two-year institutions
until 2014 – and the present sample ends in 2013 – such a relationship is expected. Furthermore,
these estimates illustrate the ineffectiveness of input-based funding: in the absence of an incentive
to increase performance – in the form of graduation, completion, or attainment rates – institutions
will seek to improve enrollment numbers without a corresponding improvement in outcomes (?).
The results presented are especially salient in an era where researchers have begun to criticize or
question the adoption of performance-based funding policies. In the absence of such policies it is
quite possible that – in order to increase appropriations – community colleges will enroll students
with no intention of or incentive to help the student successfully complete their course of study.
By focusing on the two-year sector, this study is able to minimize the concern of the extant
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literature regarding the degree to which distance measures of competition are necessary in the study
of higher education markets (Linick, 2014). As less selective institutions, both community colleges
and FPCUs have been shown to compete on a geographic market dimension (Cellini, 2009, 2010).
Considering the geographic location of community colleges – counties – it is plausible assumption
that students deciding between a community college and a for-profit institution will be doing so
among a geographically-bound set of alternatives (Iloh & Tierney, 2014). Similarly, although
focusing on a single geographic location – the State of Ohio – sacrifices some external validity
for internal validity, this study has the advantage of holding constant state-level variables such
as regulatory environment and political support for public higher education (Nicholson-Crotty &
Meier, 2002). Given the lack of information regarding the degree to which states are able to
regulate the entry of FPCUs, an examination of the impact of FPCU entry on public institutions
within a single state alleviates the degree to which omitted measures of the state’s regulatory
environment bias empirical estimates.
With the primary concern of this study being the impact of increased competition on
the efficiency and productivity of community colleges, the results are unable to capture the
mechanisms through which community colleges are increasing said efficiency. This question
remains empirically difficult to examine and requires researchers to crack open the “black box”
of postsecondary institutions as well as establish the degree to which there is a causal relationship
between operations and performance. In light of the estimates noting both a negative as well as a
lack of relationship between efficiency and productivity, a promising line of future research is the
examination of the degree to which a focus on increasing input efficiency comes at the expense of
increased degree production.
Overall, this study contributes to the larger policy discussions surrounding the degree to
which public sector institutions are able to become more efficient when faced with private
sector competition. Illustrating that community colleges – when faced with competition from
FPCUs – increase technical efficiency but such increases in technical efficiency do not lead to
increases in productivity, results converge with findings of others which suggest that future policies
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must take into account the relationship between community colleges, FPCUs, and the incentives
embedded in performance-based as well as regulatory policies (Cellini, 2009, 2010). Specifically,
both policymakers as well as researchers would be wise to consider the policies and incentives
embedded in these policies to increase efficiency. For example – are community colleges changing
admissions practices to target students who are likely to enroll but less likely to complete their
degree? Moreover, do the results presented here change following the adoption of performance-
based funding policies which shift the incentive structure of postsecondary institutions from inputs
to outputs? While these questions remain unanswered, results illustrate that one segment of a
higher education market may be empirically realized even if in unexpected ways.
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Chapter 3
Modeling For-Profit College Entry and Exit: An Application of
the Split-Panel Jackknife
3.1 Introduction
From 2000 to 2010 undergraduate enrollments in for-profit colleges increased from 0.4 million
to 1.7 million students, considerably altering the postsecondary education landscape. Despite
the sector’s exponential growth – as well as the interest of policymakers in the behavior of for-
profit colleges – much of the extant research remains descriptive (Cellini, 2005). Those studies
examining for-profit colleges are often performance evaluations focused primarily on student labor
market outcomes without accounting for the environment in which for-profit colleges operate
(Cellini & Chaudhary, 2014; Cellini & Turner, 2016; Hillman, 2014; Jaquette & Parra, 2016).
Furthermore, few studies examine why there are more institutions operating in some markets than
others – an oversight compounded by several other factors.
First, while there have been criticisms leveraged against for-profit colleges for engaging in
predatory marketing and enrollment strategies aimed at specific communities – typically, urban
minority populations – these assumptions are rarely evaluated empirically (Holland & DeLuca,
2016). Those studies examining such claims tend to focus on the decisions of students as opposed
to the behavior of institutions. Or rather, studies examine the enrollment decisions and patterns
of students – the demand for for-profit education – as opposed to the location decisions of for-
profit colleges which is the supply of for-profit education (Chung, 2012; Iloh & Tierney, 2014).
Second, although there is an emerging body of literature concerning educational deserts – areas
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where students have few postsecondary options from which to choose – this set of studies provides
static estimates of institutional counts and focus on the degree to which educational deserts
are systematically drawn around traditionally disadvantaged populations (Hillman, 2016). This
study remedies such oversights by empirically modeling the entry and exist decisions of for-profit
colleges at the county level. Specifically, these decisions are modeled by the split-panel jackknife
probit estimator, which allows for the inclusion of unbiased fixed effects in a nonlinear model.
Through applying this estimator to examining the supply decisions of for-profit colleges, this study
evaluates the degree to which the normative claims of the extant literature are empirically realized.
3.2 Review of the Relevant Literature
Little research directly examines the local conditions that lead to the market entry and/or exit
of for-profit colleges. Two major exceptions, however, examine the impact of the broader policy
environment on the market share of for-profit colleges. Finding that an increase in taxpayer support
for community colleges – in the form of bond measures providing institutions with an additional
source of revenue – decreases the entry of for-profit colleges into a given market, Cellini (2009)
notes “policymakers should consider these two types of institutions together in designing effective
policies in the two-year college market” (25). A later study by Cellini (2010) also found that an
increase in the per-student award of federal and state grant programs encourages the entry of for-
profits into a market – defined as a county – while also increasing community college enrollments –
findings that suggest “need-based financial aid programs...provide incentives for [for-profit] entry”
(549). Cellini also notes, however, the need for further research determining the specific market
characteristics incentivizing for-profit entry. Despite Cellini’s results illustrating the interaction of
for-profits with their larger policy environment, the generalizability of Cellini’s studies is unknown
for several reasons.
First, Cellini examines for-profit colleges in one state: California. While little is known
regarding the extent to which the regulation of for-profits varies by state, an examination of
market entry across states would provide a more generalizable estimation of the phenomena.
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Specifically, as one of the first states to pass major legislation regarding for-profit colleges – as well
as having one of the largest systems of public institutions in the country – California may not be
generalizable to other state environments (Cellini, 2005). With policy analysis being interested in
the development of generalized statements regarding relationships, a more generalizable estimation
of the relationship between market structure and firm entry and exit is critical (Smith & Sweetman,
2016). Second – and perhaps stemming from the first limitation – Cellini’s studies provide reduced-
form estimates of for-profit entry with little examination of the local market characteristics which
impact a for-profit’s decision to enter or exit a market. Finally, Cellini’s theoretical foundation rests
on the market entry models of Bresnahan & Reiss (1987) as well as Bresnahan & Reiss (1991).
Modeling the entry of firms into small isolated markets, the models of Bresnahan and Reiss are
best suited for markets with a small number of entrants. In the present context, this assumption
is problematic due to the expectation that in some markets there will be few – if any – for-profit
colleges while others may have a large number of entrants. Due to these limitations, as well as
the limited number of studies directly examining for-profit entry/exit, other bodies of literature are
explored.
In addition to the literature examining postsecondary education markets, a body of literature
examines the location decisions of both charter and private schools. While several criticisms
of the higher education markets research also apply to the K-12 markets research, the utility
of studies examining the supply decisions of private and charter schools stems from the use of
comparable measures of educational supply and demand. Several studies, for example, note the
need for any empirical specification of market entry to capture the heterogeneous demand for
education within a specific market. Stated differently: alternative forms of education service
delivery are more likely to locate in areas served by low-performing public schools (Bifulco &
Buerger, 2015; Downes & Greenstein, 1996; Glomm et al., 2005; Zhang & Yang, 2008). A major
limitation of generalizing the findings of studies examining the supply decisions of charter and
private schools to the supply decisions of for-profit colleges, however, stems from the lack of
comparable performance measures in the postsecondary sector. While several proxies for school
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quality – such as per-pupil expenditures – have been used and have comparable measures in the
postsecondary sector, the relationship of such measures to supply decisions is unknown (Downes &
Greenstein, 1996; Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010). Theoretical and empirical developments, however,
illustrate that increases in support for public firms can both decrease the likelihood of private firm
entry as well as increase the likelihood of private firm exit (Dinerstein & Smith, 2014; Turner,
2003). Overall, the K-12 literature is limited due to the absence of a widely accepted model
of firm behavior as it relates to the non-profit status of private and charter schools (Downes &
Greenstein, 1996). In other words: it is unknown what private and charter schools are attempting
to maximize in the absence of a profit generating mechanism. Deriving an objective function of
for-profit colleges, however, is possible after examining research on the economics of hospitals.
Offering several parallels to studies on the economics of higher education – in both health and
education, firms, which can be non-profit, for-profit, or government operated, produce experience
goods – studies on the market share of various hospital service arrangements also provide a proxy
for regulatory climate: with research finding higher tax rates decrease the market share of for-profit
hospitals (Gulley & Santerre, 1993; Hansmann, 1987; Marwell & McInerney, 2005). As profit-
maximizing firms, it is assumed that for-profit colleges will take into account the compliance costs
of local regulation – such as income and property taxes – when deciding to enter a specific market
(Levinson, 1996; Lin & Sun, 2016). The degree to which there is an empirical relationship between
firm entry and state regulatory environment, however, remains unclear with recent studies finding
that the behavior of existing firms is often a stronger predictor of firm entry and exit than any formal
regulatory structure (Espínola-Arredondo & Muñoz-García, 2016; Hollingsworth, 2014). Research
on the economics of hospitals also illustrates the role of consumer base in firm behavior: whereas
non-profits tend to serve a relatively elite consumer-base, public and for-profit institutions often
compete for a relatively disadvantaged clientele (Hansmann, 1987). As such, it can be expected
that in the presence of a larger number of disadvantaged consumers, the probability of a for-profit
firm entering a specific market will increase. Additionally, the economics of hospitals literature
recognizes the role of transit costs on the behavior of for-profit firms: both firms and individuals
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will attempt to minimize the transportation costs associated with consuming a good (Dranove et al.,
1999). As profit-maximizing producers, the probability of for-profit colleges entering a market will
be greater in markets where the search and travel costs imposed upon individuals consuming a good
decreases (Hoxby, 1997; Reum & Harris, 2006).
While still meager, the research on firm entry is robust when compared to the research on firm
exit as it relates to both K-12 schools as well as postsecondary institutions. Given that for-profit
colleges often establish themselves as efficient alternatives to cumbersome public institutions,
modeling the exit decisions of for-profit colleges proves just as important as modeling for-profit
entry: a for-profit college cannot remain a viable alternative to public and non-profit institutions if
it does not remain in the market (Pandey et al., 2009). Furthermore, while several studies explicitly
examine the drivers of postsecondary institution closure, these studies focus almost exclusively on
the enrollment characteristics of schools and not the market in which these institutions operate
(Bates & Santerre, 2000; Porter & Ramirez, 2005). As such, this study provides – to the author’s
knowledge – one of the first studies to empirically and systematically examine the market-level
variables related to postsecondary firm exit.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
This study draws upon microeconomic theory. For-profit colleges – as firms – operate in quasi-
markets where they must compete with other institutions for resources such as funding, students,
faculty, and other indicators of market position (Winston, 1999). Due to the wide variation across
markets – where tuition levels, public subsidies, and financial aid packages all vary considerably
across sector – many studies question the extent to which a generalizable objective function of firm
behavior exists in higher education (Hoxby, 2013; Zemsky et al., 2001). Given the focus of the
present study being on one segment of the higher education market, such concerns are alleviated
and objective function of for-profit college behavior can be specified (Coates & Humphreys,
2002). Specifically, it is assumed that for-profit colleges seek to maximize profits while public and
non-profit colleges seek to maximize a mission (aside from profit maximization) given a budget
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constraint. Since it is logically impossible to maximize more than one dimension at the same time,
it is assumed that for-profit colleges are solely profit maximizers and will only enter a market if
such an action is expected to be profitable (Jensen, 2001; Kofoed, 2013). Therefore, the probability
of a firm (i) entering a market (j) is a function of the expected total revenue (TR) and expected total
costs (TC) associated with each market:
Ui j =U(T R j,TC j)
As fully profit-maximizing firms, for-profit colleges will only locate in markets where
T R j>TC j (Walrath, 2010). Following this logic, it can be assumed that in the absence of any




To examine the impact of local market structures on the entry and exist decisions of for-profit
colleges, this study draws on a dataset of United States counties from 2007 to 2012. While there
is little agreement upon how to define a higher education market, previous research notes that
students attending for-profit colleges often do so within a 14-mile radius from their home (Cellini,
2010). Therefore it is a plausible assumption that students will not travel outside of their counties to
attend a for-profit college. The Delta Cost Project from the U.S. Department of Education IPEDS
Database provides information on the number of for-profit colleges operating within a county in
a given year. Data on the demographics and market structures of counties is provided by the
American Community Survey, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Tax Foundation.
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3.4.2 Estimation Strategy
From the utility function outline above it is natural to use discrete choice estimation techniques.
Under a discrete choice framework, each for-profit college chooses one of two possible actions:
to enter/exit a market or not (Bresnahan & Reiss, 1991). As such, the following probit model is
estimated:
Y ∗jt = X jtβ +d j +dt +ρ jt + ε jt (3.1)
where Y ∗jt is a latent variable correlated with the likelihood of a for-profit exiting or entering
county j at time t. While Y ∗jt is a function of supply and demand factors, it is not observable. Instead
a binary variable Yjt is observed, taking on a value of 1 if there is for-profit entry (or exit) in county
j at time t and 0 otherwise using the following rule:
Yjt =

1 Y ∗jt ≥ 1
0 otherwise
(3.2)
X jt is a vector of explanatory variables including tax rates, wages, unemployment rate,
educational level, veteran population, for-profit density, non-profit/public institution density,
transportation costs, and population; β is a vector of corresponding estimated coefficients; d j and
dt capture county and time fixed-effects respectively, and ε jt is the error term (Draganska et al.,
2008; Wong et al., 2010)
In order to solve the potential endogeneity problem of market entry and/or exit being driven
by the presence of unmeasured, time-invariant county characteristics, a fixed-effects approach is
employed. The use of fixed-effects in nonlinear panel models, however, are often biased due to
the incidental parameter problem: any estimate will be a function of the estimated fixed effects
(Bargain & Melly, 2008; Fernández-Val & Weidner, 2016). In order to correct for any incidental
parameter bias that may be introduced by the inclusion of fixed-effects, a panel jackknife bias
correction is applied. To illustrate the correction let θ̂ represent the bias corrected estimates
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produced by the following equation:
θ̂ = (τ +1)∗ γ − (τ −1)∗ γ1 − γ2 (3.3)
Where γ is the uncorrected fixed effect estimator using the entire sample, γ1 is the mean of the
τ uncorrected fixed effect estimators for each of the τ subpanels in which one time-period is left
out; γ2 is the mean of the two sub-panels in which half of the sample is left out (Fernández-Val &
Weidner, 2016).
An automatic method of bias correction, the jackknife technique requires a researcher to meet
relatively few assumptions when compared to other bias-correction techniques (Efron & Gong,
1983). When applied to panel data, however, the jackknife correction assumes stationarity over
time for the processes of the observed variables (Dhaene & Jochmans, 2015; Fernández-Val &
Weidner, 2016; Kunsch, 1989). In the instance that the processes of the observed variables are
not stationary test statistics no longer follow expected distributions and estimates may be wildly
inflated (Choi, 2001; De Wachter et al., 2007). In order to avoid violating this assumption – and
producing spurious estimates – two separate unit root tests for panel-data were conducted: the
Augmented Dickey Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test. For both tests the null-hypothesis states
that all panels contain a unit root and a rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that at least one
panel is stationary. Both tests reject the null hypothesis and provide evidence that the assumptions
for the jackknife correction are met.
3.4.2.1 Variable Selection
Returning to the model specified in Eq. (2.1), the choice of explanatory variables is informed by
the empirical literature from related fields. In addition to several conventional measures of demand
for postsecondary education – such as high school enrollment (HSENROLL) and population age
25 and older without a college degree (EDU) – Eq. (2.1) also includes measures related to firm
entry and exit broadly speaking. One such measure – the total number of for-profits divided by a
county’s population (STRUC) – allows for an examination of the degree to which the market niche
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for a for-profit education is filled. In the instance that this niche is already filled, there will be a
negative relationship between for-profit density and the probability of firm entry in county j during
year t (Arauzo-Carod & Teruel-Carrizosa, 2005; Harrison & Laincz, 2008). Ignoring the potential
endogeneity of STRUC – or the possibility that a county’s market structure is likely correlated with
unmeasured locational factors that influence the market structure of its neighbors – runs the risk of
producing estimates which are only descriptive in nature. To address this endogeneity, I explicitly
model the spatial correlation of market structure by including a spatial lag of the raw number of
for-profit institutions in neighboring counties. Similar to a lagged dependent variable model, the
inclusion of a spatial lag allows for the possibility that counties with specific market structures,
resulting in a spatial trend in the decision to enter or exit a specific county. The inclusion of the
spatial lag - ρ - is efficiently estimated via maximum likelihood and unbiased when corrected
via the jackknife technique (Hahn & Newey, 2004; Kalenkoski & Lacombe, 2008). Given the
interest of the present study in simply controlling for the possibility of spatial spillovers, not the
interpretation of such spillovers, the marginal effects for direct, indirect, and total impacts are not
calculated.
In addition to STRUC, TRANSP also captures the potential costs incurred by for-profits in
specific markets. Operationalized as the share of a county’s population which commutes via public
transportation, TRANSP represents the ease in which an individual can travel to an institution of
their choice. It is expected that as the ease with which an individual can travel to an institution
increases – and the costs associated with doing so decrease – the probability of firm entry is higher
and the probability of firm exit is lower (Arthur, 1990; Reum & Harris, 2006). Vector X in Eq.
(3.1) also contains two additional explanatory variables of interest: MILITARY and BUSINESS.
The inclusion of MILITARY – the percentage of a county’s population having served in the military
– is necessary due to claims of for-profits preying on military populations and the federal funds
attached to such students (Deming et al., 2012). As profit-maximizing firms, it is expected that as
MILITARY increases the probability of firm entry also increases.
Adopting a strategy similar to that of Hansmann (1987), Chang & Tuckman (1990), as well
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as, Gulley & Santerre (1993) who all find that a market’s tax structure influences the share of
for-profit hospitals, BUSINESS captures the impact of a state’s business climate on the entry and
exit decisions of for-profit colleges. An operationalization of the Tax Foundation’s State Business
Tax Climate Index, each state’s BUSINESS score is generated through a comparison of states on
more than 100 variables in the five major areas of taxation: corporate, individual, unemployment,
insurance, and property tax. Following this comparison, each state is assigned a score from 0 to 10
representing a state’s relative position with 0 representing the state with the worst relative business
climate Walczak et al. (2017). The inclusion of BUSINESS allows for an assessment of the degree
to which for-profit colleges behave in a manner similar to traditional for-profit businesses. An
additional measure, LABOR – the annual median wage for postsecondary vocational educators –
captures the labor costs incurred by for-profit colleges within a specific market. It is expected that
as LABOR increases the probability of for-profit entry decreases and the probability of for-profit
exit increases.
In order to isolate the effects of the aforementioned variables, vector X in Eq. (3.1) includes
several other socioeconomic controls: total population (POP), per capita income (INCOME),
and the percent of the population which is white (DIVERSITY). DIVERSITY is included due to
claims that for-profit colleges specifically target minority communities and studies; if this is the
case DIVERSITY will be significantly and negatively associated with for-profit entry. In order
to facilitate ease of interpretation all variables were standardized. Table 3.1 presents summary
statistics of all variables.
3.5 Results
Table 3.2 reports the probability of firm entry from three different specifications: pooled maximum
likelihood estimates which ignore the cross-sectional, time series nature of the data; uncorrected
fixed-effect maximum likelihood estimates which are shown to produce biased estimates; and
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
M SD Min Max
Entry 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Exit 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
zPOP 0.39 1.39 -0.47 16.53
zHSENROLL -0.01 0.91 -3.73 3.28
zEDU -0.07 0.94 -1.40 2.44
zINCOME 0.22 1.09 -2.17 6.15
zMILITARY -0.25 0.95 -2.68 3.54
zDIVERSITY -0.30 1.06 -4.10 1.21
zTRANSP -0.04 1.02 -1.40 8.30
zLABOR -0.03 1.00 -2.53 3.36
zBUSINESS -0.04 1.02 -2.08 3.10
zURATE -0.03 0.95 -2.01 3.63
zSTRUC 0.47 1.00 -0.96 6.41
zCOMP -0.00 0.85 -1.07 4.58
Observations 1927
maximum likelihood estimates corrected for bias via the split-panel jackknife. All three sets
of estimates are presented in order to address the changes between coefficients across model
specifications as well as illustrate the dangers with interpreting either naive (i.e. pooled) or biased
(i.e. uncorrected) estimates as causal in applied policy research.
Table 3.2 illustrates an almost universal switching of signs between the naive estimates and
the estimates corrected for bias via the split-panel jackknife. Although the importance of such
changes should be obvious, the difference between models also illustrate the potential dangers
associated with naive and/or bias estimation strategies utilized across applied policy research.
Given the popular discussions and assumptions surrounding the behavior of for-profit institutions,
the interpretation of the naive estimates as causal could result in ineffective or counterproductive
policies and regulation. For example, while the naive estimates suggest that as the diversity
of a county’s population increases so does the probability of for-profit entry, the bias-corrected
estimates illustrate that the probability of for-profit entry increases with increases in a county’s
white population. This relationship is mirrored in the switch on the directionality of the estimate
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Table 3.2: Estimates for Firm Entry
MLE F.E. MLE B.C. MLE
zPOP 0.435∗∗∗ (0.109) 2.828∗ (1.639) -18.829∗∗∗ (1.309)
zHSENROLL -0.050 (0.035) 0.103 (0.106) 0.093 (0.099)
zEDU -0.043 (0.033) 0.401∗ (0.219) -0.505∗∗∗ (0.181)
zINCOME 0.156∗∗∗ (0.042) 0.638∗ (0.328) -0.593∗ (0.303)
zMILITARY -0.165∗∗∗ (0.047) -0.326 (0.268) -0.714∗∗∗ (0.213)
zDIVERSITY -0.161∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.074 (0.389) 1.247∗∗∗ (0.368)
zTRANSP -0.211∗∗∗ (0.045) -0.063 (0.122) 0.191∗ (0.114)
zLABOR -0.017 (0.038) -0.206∗ (0.111) -0.218∗∗ (0.089)
zBUSINESS 0.044 (0.038) -0.928∗∗∗ (0.275) -1.473∗∗∗ (0.204)
zURATE 0.105∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.085 (0.179) -0.576∗∗∗ (0.154)
STRUC 0.581∗∗∗ (0.050) 3.410∗∗∗ (0.368) -2.190∗∗∗ (0.246)
COMP -0.087∗∗ (0.034) -0.953 (0.599) 0.894∗∗ (0.380)
ρ -0.035∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.495 (0.396) 10.290∗∗∗ (0.245)
Constant -1.282∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.103 (1.085)
N 4457.000 1927.000 1927.000
χ2 384.533 . 861.745
Loglikelihood -1346.916 -756.989 -756.989
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
for URATE – whereas naive models would lead an analyst to believe that for-profit entry increases
with increases in unemployment rate, the bias corrected estimate suggest the opposite.
As illustrated by Table 3.3, the naive pooled maximum likelihood estimates indicate a
significant relationship between firm exit and almost every explanatory variable. The difference in
the strength, significance, and direction between the naive estimates and the bias correct model,
however, illustrate the dangers in the assumptions made by the naive model: specifically, that
there is no correlation between individual counties across years or between counties within the
same year. The misleading estimates produced by the naive estimates are illustrated by examining
variables of interest. For example, whereas the naive estimates present no statistical relationship
between veteran population and for-profit exit, the bias-corrected estimates display a negative,
statistically significant relationship between veteran population and for-profit exit. Similarly,
whereas the naive estimates would lead an analyst to believe that there is a negative relationship
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Table 3.3: Estimates for Firm Exit
MLE F.E. MLE B.C. MLE
zPOP -0.149∗ (0.088) -1.112 (2.042) -6.950∗∗∗ (1.572)
zHSENROLL -0.006 (0.036) -0.006 (0.131) -0.381∗∗∗ (0.116)
zEDU 0.144∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.259 (0.219) 2.898∗∗∗ (0.205)
zINCOME 0.205∗∗∗ (0.040) -0.001 (0.424) -0.040 (0.378)
zMILITARY -0.030 (0.041) 0.310 (0.294) -0.817∗∗∗ (0.252)
zDIVERSITY -0.158∗∗∗ (0.033) -0.433 (0.399) -0.499 (0.412)
zTRANSP -0.136∗∗∗ (0.038) -0.204 (0.164) -0.313∗∗ (0.151)
zLABOR -0.023 (0.035) 0.077 (0.142) 0.595∗∗∗ (0.114)
zBUSINESS -0.023 (0.040) 1.382∗∗∗ (0.338) 2.363∗∗∗ (0.259)
zURATE 0.038 (0.036) -0.146 (0.239) -0.124 (0.207)
STRUC 0.051 (0.032) -1.463∗∗∗ (0.286) 3.416∗∗∗ (0.224)
COMP 0.004 (0.036) 0.751 (0.533) 2.687∗∗∗ (0.378)
ρ 0.039∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.247 (0.348) -3.516∗∗∗ (0.284)
Constant -1.814∗∗∗ (0.052) -1.147 (1.506)
N 4457.000 1136.000 1136.000
χ2 127.037 . 243.266
Loglikelihood -880.410 -469.351 -469.351
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
between a county’s white population and for-profit exit, the bias-corrected estimates reveal that
there is no statistically meaningful relationship between the diversity of a county’s population
and for-profit entry. Likewise, the naive model understates the relationship between several
variables and firm-exit: while TRANSP, POP, and EDU remain significant and maintain the same
directionality across models, the magnitude of the relationship is greater for all three in the bias-
corrected model. Finally, HSENROLL, LABOR, and BUSINESS – which would be interpreted as
non-statistically significant in a naive estimation strategy – are all statistically significant when
applying the bias-corrected estimator. Additionally, Table 3.3 presents an almost total lack of
statistical significance and the absence of a χ2 statistic in the uncorrected fixed-effects model;
providing evidence for the incidental parameters problem known to plague non-linear models.
While a comparison of the coefficients in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 allow for an examination of the
different conclusions that can be drawn between the naive, biased, and bias-corrected estimators,
the main interest in discrete choice models is identifying the effects of changing a regressor on the
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Table 3.4: Average Partial Effects
Entry Exit
zPOP -0.162*** (0.219) -0.258*** (0.136)
zHSENROLL 0.009 (0.115) -0.012** (0.007)
zEDU 0.032** (0.031) 0.092*** (0.026)
zINCOME 0.057 (0.050) 0.010 (0.022)
zMILITARY -0.073*** (0.029) -0.007** (0.032)
zDIVERSITY 0.067*** (0.036) -0.047 (0.046)
zTRANSP -0.002 (0.012) -0.024* (0.020)
zLABOR -0.035* (0.016) 0.020*** (0.010)
zBUSINESS -0.172*** (0.062) 0.177*** (0.126)
zURATE -0.020*** (0.157) -0.016 (0.018)
zSTRUC 0.328*** (0.218) 0.005*** (0.133)
zCOMP -0.137* (0.071) 0.131*** (0.071)
ρ 0.256*** (0.040) -0.086*** (0.028)
N 1927 1136
χ2 861.745 243.266
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05 , *** p < .01
conditional probability of firm entry or exit which is captured through the average partial effects
presented in Table 3.4.
Turning first to for-profit entry the average partial effects illustrate that a one standard-deviation
increase in population reduces the probability of a for-profit entering county j in year t by
approximately 16.2%; likewise, a one standard-deviation increase in population also reduces the
probability of a for-profit college exiting county j in year t by approximately 25.8%. In terms
of demographic explanatory variables, the educational characteristics of a county’s population are
statistically significant in predicting both firm entry and exit. First, for every standard deviation
increase in a county’s high school enrollment, the probability of for-profit exit increases 1.2%.
Suggesting that for-profit colleges and universities may be more interested in entering markets
with a larger “untraditional” study body, this estimate is supported by the estimate on EDU: for
every standard deviation increase in the proportion of a county over the age of 25 without a college
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degree, the probability of for-profit entry increases 3.2%. Conversely, for every standard deviation
in the proportion of a county over the age of 25 without a college degree, the probability of for-
profit exit also increases 9.2%. One possible explanation for this result is the differing mission
of for-profit colleges and universities: although often treated homogeneously, some for-profits
are more likely to target untraditional students than others such as institutions which focus on
vocational skills as opposed to business or other professional programs.
Other estimates suggest that for-profit colleges and universities may be relatively risk adverse
and avoid predominately minority counties as well as those counties in which students are unable
to afford the costs of their programs. Whereas DIVERSITY illustrates that the probability of
for-profit entry increases approximately 6.7% for every standard deviation increase in a county’s
white population, URATE shows that the probability of for-profit entry decreases approximately
2.0% for every standard deviation increase in unemployment rate. Likewise, the partial effect
for MILITARY indicates that for every standard deviation increase in the percentage of a county’s
veteran population, the probability of for-profit entry decreases 7.3% – casting further doubt upon
the assumptions of the extant literature. The relationship between LABOR and for-profit entry as
well as exit is expected: a standard deviation increase in a county’s labor costs decreases the
probability of firm entry by approximately 3.5% and increases the probability of firm exit by
approximately 2.0%.
Finally, the relationship between for-profit entry/exit and the last variable of interest –
BUSINESS: for every standard deviation increase in the “friendless” of a state’s business climate
the probability of for-profit entry decreases by approximately 17.2%. Conversely, for every
standard deviation increase in the “friendliness” of a state’s business climate the probability firm
exit increases by approximately 17.7%. Although at face value unexpected, literature on the
economics of entry-deterrence provides an explanation for this relationship: in the absence of
any formal for-profit regulation the behavior of existing firms in a market conveys the marginal
costs and benefits associated with a specific market environment (Espínola-Arredondo & Muñoz-
García, 2016; Milgrom & Roberts, 1982). In this scenario, a less friendly business environment
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(e.g. one with more “regulations”) may enhance the profit of existing firms while deterring new
ones. Specifically, for-profit firms who are able to survive and adapt in an unfriendly business
environment may increase their outputs or inputs – such as student enrollments – to deter potential
entrants from entering the market due to the strong market hold of existing firms (Dinerstein &
Smith, 2014). Future research may benefit from exploring this relationship in further detail as well
as examining the extent to which such behaviors cause welfare losses.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to structurally model and quantitatively analyze the county-level
market factors associated with the probability of for-profit college entry and exit. The results
– which illustrate no meaningful relationship between for-profit entry/exit and disadvantaged
populations – cast doubt on the popular assumptions and discourse surrounding for-profit colleges.
With much of the current literature on for-profit colleges presenting the institutions as predatory
actors targeting disadvantaged – often minority – populations, the coefficients and partial effects
on measures of these populations – URATE, MILITARY, DIVERSITY - suggest for-profits are
more likely to enter predominately white, well employed, civilian counties. Furthermore, those
measures which are statistically significant suggest the structural characteristics of markets are
stronger predictors of firm entry and exit: for-profits are more likely to enter counties where a
high number of for-profit colleges already operate. The exception to this generalization are those
counties with less friendly business environment; a finding which suggests that for-profits are
engaging in a more complex game of entry than one of simply weighing the marginal costs and
revenues of specific markets. Overall, however, these results are not unexpected when considering
the current literature: those studies analyzing for-profit colleges often examine only one side of
the supply and demand equation. Stated differently: much of the extant literature examines the
decisions of students to enroll in a for-profit institution and then infer from such decisions that
students were purposefully misled by the for-profit in which they enrolled (Holland & DeLuca,
2016; Iloh, 2016; Iloh & Tierney, 2014). This shortcoming is further compounded by the fact that
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these studies are often qualitative and lack generalizability outside of the context in which they
were conducted (Iloh & Tierney, 2014; Iloh, 2016; Kutz, 2010). As such, the estimates presented
above represent a generalizable approach to examining the behavior of for-profit colleges while
also providing one of the first applications of a novel bias correction method in the policy analysis
literature.
In addition to the substantive contribution of this study, the results presented also contribute
methodologically. Given the interest of policy analysts in analyzing the change of a specific
economic actor over time while also accounting for endogeneity, a fixed-effects approach
represents a convenient and appropriate means of doing so (Cellini, 2008). The use of fixed-
effects, however, becomes complicated in the context of non-linear models due to the possibility
of the incidental parameters problem producing biased estimates (Fernández-Val, 2009; Neyman
& Scott, 1948). Such a problem is unfortunate due to the utility offered by structural models
to the realms of policy analysis and program evaluation, warranting the study and use of novel
methodologies for inclusion in a policy analyst’s methodological toolbox (Low & Meghir, 2017;
Pathak & Shi, 2017). While the technical details of the bias correction are summarized above, this
study represents one of the first applications of the jackknife bias correction technique for panel
data to a substantive policy area (Clapp et al., 2017; Dubois et al., 2017). Given the divergence
between the bias corrected estimator and the conventional fixed effect estimator in Tables 2.2 and
2.3, further application of the technique would prove fruitful across policy realms.
Outside of the methodological contributions of the present study outlines above, the results
presented also illustrate the need for a more nuanced understanding of for-profit college behavior.
Aside from those studies examining the labor market outcomes of students enrolled in for-profit
colleges, much of the literature concerning for-profit colleges is riddled with normative claims of
for-profit behavior without providing generalizable estimates supporting such claims. By providing
evidence that for-profit entry and exit is influenced heavily by existing market structures, this study
attempts to move the extant literature away from descriptive – and often normative – accounts of
for-profit college behavior and toward a body of literature providing methodologically rigorous
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and generalizable estimates of for-profit behavior.
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Chapter 4
Information Disclosure Policies as Policy Instruments: a
Comparison of Methods
4.1 Introduction
A great amount of scholarly – as well as journalistic – attention has been devoted to the
topic of college affordability as it relates to public postsecondary institutions; relatively fewer
studies, however, have examined the relationship between public policy and private postsecondary
institutions (Delaney & Kearney, 2015; Jaquette & Hillman, 2015). Given the substantial
growth in the cost of attending for-profit institutions in recent years, emerging evidence that
students attending for-profit institutions earn less than their public and non-profit counterparts,
and rising borrowing and default rates in the for-profit sector, scholars and policymakers have
begun expressing interest in the relationship between public policy and the costs of for-profit
institutions (Cellini & Daroila, 2013; Cellini & Turner, 2016). Despite the growing concern
over college affordability – especially as it relates to for-profit institutions – there exists no clear
consensus regarding the factors associated with tuition levels in the private sector. In attempts
to examine possible drivers of for-profit institution tuition levels, this study leverages an under
utilized resource: the Department of Education’s Financial Responsibility Composite Scores
(FRCS/scores).
Established to offer protection to taxpayers and students, an institution’s score serves as a
regulatory transparency policy: a form of information disclosure that attempts to correct market
failures while improving welfare (Weil et al., 2006). Although the impact of information disclosure
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policies are widely discussed in the realm of environmental policy, the empirical impact of these
programs remains understudied in different policy settings (Bae, 2012; Delmas et al., 2010).
Given the recent expansion of regulation-through-information policies – as opposed to traditional
command-and-control approaches – this study attempts to provide insight into the effectiveness
of information disclosure policies when applied to education policy issues as well as the various
strengths and weaknesses of information disclosure and similar regulation-through-information
strategies broadly speaking. As such, this study contributes to the growing body of literature
examining the intricacies of various policy instruments as well as providing insight into the
differential behavior of private postsecondary institutions – specifically for-profit institutions. To
do so, I discuss the goals of the FRCS program and similar information disclosure policies, briefly
survey previous research on the tuition setting behaviors of postsecondary institutions, followed
by an econometric analysis of the impact of an institution’s score on tuition levels using several
methods to control for endogeneity. Finally, I discuss the implications of this study’s results for
both postsecondary education policy as well as policy instrument design broadly speaking.
4.2 Financial Responsibility Scores as Policy Instruments
Reflecting the relative financial health of private non-profit and for-profit postsecondary
institutions, an institution’s score helps the Department of Education determine whether an
institution maintains the financial standards necessary to participate in Title-IV programs –
the primary source of federal funding for higher education.1Although similar to traditional
command and control regulations – the scores allow the government to monitor institutional
compliance with federally mandated standards of financial health with non-compliance punished
through the removal of Title-IV eligibility – the scores are in actuality regulatory transparency
policies. Seeking to change the behavior of consumers and/or sellers in specific ways, regulatory
transparency policies – such as the FRCS program– attempt to remedy an instance of information
1Title-IV programs include loans (e.g. Direct Loans), grants (e.g. Pell Grants), as well as the federal work study
program.
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symmetry known as the “consumer protection problem:” the FRCS program attempts to
incentivize financially responsible practices of institutions while also attempting to insure that
potentially uninformed parties – such as students and/or their parents – are adequately informed
regarding the good they are purchasing (Dill & Soo, 2004; Fraas & Lutter, 2016). Specifically,
each score is calculate from three ratios taking into account the financial health of an institution:
1. An institution’s Primary Reserve Ratio – a measure of viability and liquidity – is an
institution’s adjusted equity divided by total expenses.
2. An institution’s Equity Ratio - a measure of capital resources and ability to borrow – is an
institution’s modified equity divided by modified expenses.
3. An institution’s Net Income Ratio - a measure of profitability - is an institution’s income
before taxes divided by total revenues.
Following the weighted sum of the above ratios, each institution’s score ranges from -1.0 to
3.0. Institutions receiving a score of less than 1 are considered “not financially responsible”
and are subject to provisional Title-IV certification and cash monitoring; institutions receiving
a score between 1.0 and 1.4 are considered financially responsible but require additional oversight;
institution’s receiving a score between 1.5 and 3.0 are considered financially responsible and
require no further oversight. While the language forwarded by the policy suggests that an
institution’s score is a command-and-control regulation, there has – at the time of this study
– been no known case of an institution being stripped of its Title-IV eligibility as a result of
the policy (Fain, 2017). As such, the FRCS program is in practice an information disclosure
instrument. The logic of the FRCS as a form of information provision, however, rests on a long
and complex causal chain – a chain resulting in the use of information by users purchasing a good
or service (Dill, 1997). Yet, the research on information disclosure policies suggests that there are
three separate avenues through which regulatory disclosure policies may have an impact on firm
behavior regardless of whether the information conveyed by the policies is used by consumers:
market pressures, political pressures, and internal pressures (Bennear & Coglianese, 2012).
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Considering market and political pressures in tandem, a political economic perspective
suggests that the mandating of information disclosure may signal the state’s willingness to impose
future regulations on a sector of the economy unless firms self-regulate (Delmas et al., 2010).
Therefore, the policy as currently implemented may itself act as an incentive to prevent shirking
on the behalf of institutions lest the state impose a traditional command-and-control policy
under which an institution’s Title-IV eligibility would be revoked once an institution is deemed
financially irresponsible. In order for this threat to be valid, however, an institution must have both
the incentive and capacity to comply with the mandated standards (Lane & Kivistö, 2008). In the
current context, both an institution’s sector as well as the composition of an institution’s student
body may influence both the capacity and incentive to comply – if only symbolically – with the
mandated standards in a related manner. In terms of enrollment composition, institution’s serving
predominately disadvantaged, part-time populations are likely to have less incentive to comply
with the mandated standards due to the assumption that such students often make enrollment
decisions in terms of convenience factors as opposed to matters related to institutional reputation
(Iloh & Tierney, 2014). Similarly, for-profit and non-profit colleges – on average – appeal to
different stakeholder constituencies. Whereas non-profits are assumed to use their finances in a
responsible manner that helps them realize their mission, however defined, they are also expected
to provide their investors and donors with access to a mechanism through which to influence the
investment and management decisions of the institution. On the other hand, for-profit institutions
rarely encounter “activist investors” and are less concerned with external stakeholders attempting
to keep the firm “on mission” (Doshi et al., 2013; Toutkoushian & Raghav, 2017; Tuckman
& Chang, 1992). Such differences are compounded by the fact that for-profits, as firms often
not expected to produce a good that also furthers a broader mission, predominately serve those
consumers less likely to use information to begin with. Given this discussion, the question asked by
this study is does the mandatory disclosure of an institution’s financial health lead to responsible
institutional behaviors? To help answer this question, the discussion now turns to previous research
examining the impact of similar information disclosure policies.
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While the relatively low cost of information disclosure strategies has much such policies
attractive compared to command-and-control regulations, there is growing debate as to whether
information disclosure may be counterproductive (Bae, 2016). Although supporters of information
disclosure policies assert that the provision of information corrects for market failures in the
form of information asymmetry, skeptics of information disclosure not only point to the lack of
systematic evidence regarding the effectiveness of the policies but also suggest that information
disclosure may exacerbate the “information gap” (Bae, 2012; Dranove et al., 2003). For
while information disclosure strategies are fundamentally designed to correct the information
asymmetries between transaction parties, the strategies often favor those groups that can incur
search costs in gathering information (Graham, 2002; McEwen, 1978; Stigler, 1961). Stated
differently: those students more likely to use the information – typically, white relatively wealthy
students and their parents – are able to afford the transaction costs associated with finding and
comparing institutions on selected information criteria (Lovenheim & Walsh, 2017). Given that
firms will only respond to any legally mandated standard if their stakeholders care enough about
the information being release, it can be assumed that firms with a larger number of those students
less inclined to make use of information disclosure policies are more likely to respond to regulation
in less-than-ideal ways. Despite the different theoretical expectations regarding the effectiveness
of information disclosure polices, two additional aspects of information disclosure policies must
be recognized. First, there is little systematic empirical research on the impact of information
disclosure policies on social welfare outside of the environmental policy area (Delmas et al.,
2010; Fraas & Lutter, 2016). Although the environmental policy has contributed greatly to the
understanding of the various intricacies of information disclosure, this literature relies heavily
on data from the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI); a body of literature which has produced no
clear consensus regarding the effectiveness of information-based policy instruments (Taylor et al.,
2012). The inferences drawn from the TRI and similar right-to-know policies, however, have been
called into questions due to regulatory nuances – such as reporting thresholds – leading to biased
estimates (Bennear, 2008). Furthermore, the effects of information disclosure on the behavior of
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regulated firms – as opposed to the behavior of consumers – remains unclear (Bennear & Olmstead,
2008). As such, an analysis of the FRCS program is a fruitful lens through which to address both
of these issues – as well as speak to the broader issue of college affordability – in several ways.
First, information disclosure policies are most effective when applied to experience goods:
goods and/or services whose value can only be determined by consuming or experiencing it (Vining
& Weimer, 1988). Specifically, information disclosure policies may minimize the deadweight
loss associated with additional regulatory interventions by correcting information asymmetries
prior to a consumer selecting a good and/or service (Miceli et al., 1996). As an experience good,
postsecondary eduction offers a theoretically appropriate and econometrically convenient context
in which to examine the impact of information disclosure policies. Second, an examination of
changes in the tuition of postsecondary institutions allows for an explicit measurement of the costs
information disclosure policies impose on firms (Romanosky et al., 2011). Third, the examination
of the tuition-setting behaviors of postsecondary institutions – as it relates to information disclosure
strategies – allows for an examination of the unforeseen consequences of regulations and the
differential impact of those consequences across sector and demographic (Ambrose & Diop, 2016).
Prior to discussing the impact of regulations on postsecondary tuition, however, it is necessary to
review the previous research on the drivers of tuition levels in private postsecondary institutions.
4.3 Postsecondary Education and Tuition Setting Behaviors
Recent studies examining postsecondary policies often do so to evaluate the effectiveness of
performance-based funding policies that policymakers will hope motivate institutions to increase
postsecondary degree production (Hillman et al., 2015; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014). Far
fewer studies examine the impact of public policies on the tuition setting behaviors of private
postsecondary institutions (Kelchen & Stedrak, 2016).2 Most of the research which does examine
the tuition setting behaviors of private postsecondary institutions tend to rely on the Bennett
2Note the emphasis on private postsecondary institutions. While there are number of studies examining tuition
levels in public institutions, private institutions receive relatively little attention (Zumeta, 1992).
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Hypothesis – or the idea that increases in governmental aid will lead to tuition increases across
all higher education institutions (Conner & Rabovsky, 2011; Deming et al., 2013; Jaquette &
Hillman, 2015). Specifically, the Bennett Hypothesis posits that even if financial aid leads to
lower sticker prices for students, institutions will raise overall tuition costs in order to offset the
loss of revenue (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). Despite not being empirically proven, analysts
continue to rely on the Bennett Hypothesis as an explanation for institutional behaviors with more
nuanced approaches suggesting that the relationship between governmental aid and tuition levels
is dependent on institutional type within the private sector (Delaney & Kearney, 2015).
While Singell & Stone (2007) find that each increase in federal financial aid received by
institutions is matched nearly one-for-one with an increase in tuition only by private non-profits,
Cellini & Goldin (2014) illustrate that Title-IV eligible for-profit institutions are priced 78 percent
higher than comparable institutions who cannot receive federal financial aid. A major contribution
of Cellini and Goldin’s study comes from the authors’ identification strategy: acknowledging the
potential sample selection problems due to nonrandom, meaningful differences between those
institutions eligible for Title IV funding and those who are not, the authors restrict their sample
to institutions offering programs comparable among as many dimensions as possible such as
credit hour requirements in addition to institution fixed effects. Using similar sample restriction
techniques – such as excluding specialized vocational schools and institution fixed fixed effects
– Gibbs & Marksteiner (2016) find that a $1,279 loss in Cal Grants – California’s version of
Pell Grants – leads to a sticker price decrease of approximately $1,000. While both Cellini and
Goldin as well as Gibbs and Marksteiner illustrate the need to address the nonrandom heterogeneity
within the for-profit sector, neither study directly examines the behavior of institutions while they
institutions are being regulated. In one of the few studies examining institutions while they are
being regulated, Kelchen (2016) found that for-profit institutions with sanctionable loan default
rates may charge students less in an effort to reduce borrowing levels. Kelchen’s use of regression
discontinuity, however, assumes that institution’s approaching the sanctionable cutoff are unable
to change their behaviors in order to avoid sanctions and further regulation. Given the lack of
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empirical evidence on the ways in which firms behave under regulation, such an assumption is
disputable.
In order to assess the impact of the FRCS program on the behavior of firms, operationalized as
tuition levels, an objective function of firm behavior must be explicated.
4.4 Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis
While early literature on the objective function of postsecondary institutions of education rejected
the notion that institutions behave to maximize financial profit, the rise of the for-profit institution
has lead to a segment of the postsecondary market with an explicitly profit-maximizing objective
function (Coates & Humphreys, 2002; Rothschild & White, 1993; Winston, 1999). As such it is
assumed that for-profit institutions seek to maximize profits while non-profit institutions seek to
maximize social welfare given a budget constraint. Since it is impossible for for-profit institutions
to pursue other objectives at the expense of profit-maximization it is assumed that for-profit
institutions are solely profit maximizers and engage only in behaviors they believe are profitable
(Jensen, 2001; Wheeler & Clement, 1990). Moreover, whereas the costs incurred by for-profits
are simply a function of producing a good, non-profit institutions incur both the costs of producing
the good as well as the cost of producing a specific mission (Erus & Weisbrod, 2003). Given
these differing objective functions, as well as the previous discussion on sector and consumer
characteristics, it is possible that information disclosure as a form of regulation may exacerbate the
differences in regulated firms – with firms in the present context being postsecondary institutions
of education (Delmas et al., 2010; Netz, 1998). As such, I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: Following the publication of a “poor” score, for-profit institutions will
increase tuition and non-profit institutions will lower their tuition.
Seeking to alter the behavior of institutions through information provision, the FRCS program may
inadvertently lead to increases in tuition levels at for profit institutions (Dill, 1997, 2001). While
non-profits may fear the harm a tuition increase may incur on their “trust capital” with their specific
54
stakeholder groups – such as alumni and donors – for-profit institutions make this decision simply
in terms of monetary costs (Silverman & Skinner, 2001). In order to illustrate these assumptions,
imagine the following scenario:
Suppose two institutions – one non-profit, one for-profit – are both labeled “not financially
responsible” under the FRCS program. Under the assumptions outline above, by producing
a mission good – whether that be social welfare or prestige for institution – non-profits are
constrained in terms of seeking additional sources of revenue in the form of tuition increases.
Stated differently, the stakeholder groups served by non-profit institutions would accept a tuition
increase only if they believed that the additional revenue will ultimately be used to support the
mission of the institution (Hansmann, 1987; Tuckman & Chang, 1992). Conversely, for-profit
institutions are indifferent to the traits of their consumers and lack “activist” stakeholders (Harrison
& Antweiler, 2003; Winston, 2003). Therefore, if the marginal gains associated with increasing
tuition outweigh the costs of being subjected to government regulations, for-profit institutions will
do so.
Discussion now turns to testing the proposed hypothesis.
4.5 Research Design
4.5.1 Data
Title-IV eligible private non-profit and for-profit postsecondary institutions are the primary unit
of analysis for this study. While public community colleges traditionally serve as a control group
against which to compare for-profit institutions, the finances and costs of for-profit institutions
are more similar to non-profit institutions than community colleges (Gibbs & Marksteiner, 2016;
Kutz, 2010). The Delta Cost Project provides institutional-level data for all institutions within the




The objective of this study is the examination of the impact of information disclosure policies
on the behavior of regulated firms as captured through tuition setting behaviors of private
postsecondary institutions. The outcome of interest is the change in an institution’s total tuition
and fees. As with most empirical examinations of the effects of information disclosure policies –
especially as it relates to a heterogenous product – it is difficult to establish the degree to which
information disclosures influence the revealed preferences of individual consumers (Delmas et al.,
2010). It is, however, possible to examine the effect of disclosures on the behavior of regulated
firms – an under examined aspect of information disclosure policies (Bennear & Olmstead, 2008).
In this regard, the FRCS program exhibits two features desirable for econometric identification.
First, as previously mentioned, an institution’s score not only conveys a level of risk to potential
consumers, each score corresponds to a specific dosage of oversight administered by the federal
government. Second, an institution’s score is temporally dynamic: scores vary overtime an allow
for the identification of differential effects not only across institutions but also within institutions
over time.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
M SD Min Max
Tuition Change 2.69 6.35 -68.65 111.02
Sector 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Treatment 0.16 0.48 0.00 2.00
Ln(Grant) 7.56 0.28 4.62 8.68
Ln(Size) 7.06 1.29 2.82 11.26
Ln(Intensity) 2.80 1.32 -3.98 5.47
Ln(Diversity) 4.07 1.01 -3.09 5.42
Observations 6326
In order to address the above hypothesis, predictor variables were selected in order to
approximate the various marginal costs and gains associated with institutional compliance. I first
examine the regulation-tuition relationship by estimating the following random-effects model:
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∆Tuitionit = α0 +β1T REATit +β2SECTORit+
β3(T REATit ∗SECTORit)+β4Xit +β5(tUi)+ εi (4.1)
where the dependent variable ∆Tuitionit is the percent change in real dollar tuition at
institution i in time t from real dollar tuition at institution i in time t-1; TREAT is an interval
variable representing the various degrees of financial oversight corresponding an institution’s
FRCS; SECTOR takes on a value of 0 for private non-profit institutions and 1 for private for-
profit institutions; TREAT*SECTOR is the interaction between TREAT and SECTOR allowing
for an examination of whether for-profit institutions have a differential response to information
disclosure; X is a vector of institutional controls; tU is the interaction between state fixed effects
and a time trend allowing for any trends that would impact institutions to vary by state over time;
and εit is the error term. Summary statistics for all variables are located in Table 4.1.
The explanatory variable TREAT is an interval measure taking on three values: 0, 1, and 2 with
each value corresponding to an institution’s score and subsequent oversight where:
• TREAT takes on a value of 0 if an institution’s score falls between 1.5 and 3.0; corresponding
to a status of “financially responsible” and no oversight.
• TREAT takes on a value of 1 if an institution’s score falls between 1.0 and 1.4; corresponding
to a status of “financially responsible” and minimal oversight.
• TREAT takes on a value of 2 if an institution’s score falls between -1.0 and 0.9;
corresponding to a status of “not financially responsible” and provisional Title-IV
certification and cash monitoring.
The interval measure, as opposed to an institution’s raw score, is used since this study is interested
in various across categories not within a score category. Additionally, the use of an institution’s
raw score offers no utility over the interval measure since in terms of the policy, a score of -1 is no
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different than a score of 0.5: both scores convey the same status of “not financially responsible” to
both the government and other stakeholder groups.
Turning to Hypothesis 1: while previous studies find that for-profit institutions may lower
tuition costs in attempt to recruit students less likely to engage in risky financial behaviors, other
research notes that students selecting into for-profit colleges are willing to pay higher prices for the
convenience and flexibility of for-profit institutions regardless of the risks associated with doing so
(Iloh & Tierney, 2014; Kelchen, 2016). The broader literature on information disclosure reveals
that both public and non-profit firms are more susceptible to stakeholder pressures when it comes
to financial behaviors – a finding which suggests that for-profits may charge more than their non-
profit counterparts (Kofoed, 2013; Sloan, 2000). In order to isolate the impact of an institution’s
FRCS on tuition levels, several other covariates of interest are included in Eq. (4.1). An additional
source of revenue – FEDGRANT – is also included to measure the reliance of institutions on
government funding. In line with the Bennett Hypothesis, it is assumed that institutions – both
non-profit and for-profit – will increase tuition levels in response to greater federal funding (Cellini
& Goldin, 2014; Singell & Stone, 2007; Turner, 2014). Additionally, an institution’s capacity (e.g.
profile of students) may influence an institution’s response to specific policies (Fryar & Hawes,
2011; Hillman, 2013; Hillman et al., 2014). As such, three measures of students characteristics are
included: SIZE, INTENSITY, and DIVERSITY.
SIZE – or the total enrollment of an institution – is included due to the ability of size to
moderate a firm’s sensitivity to the pressures generated by information disclosure (Doshi et al.,
2013). Conversely, INTENSITY – the proportion of an institution’s students enrolled part-time
– captures both the differing revenue and cost structures of institutions with large part-time
enrollments as well as the fact that part-time students often have a different level of commitment
to their institutions than their full-time counterparts (Toutkoushian & Raghav, 2017). As such, it
can be expected that institutions with large amounts of part-time students are less likely to face
pressures from their stakeholders (e.g. alumni) in terms of management and financial decisions
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Table 4.2: Naive Estimates
Naive Estimates
Non-Profit x No Oversight Reference Category
Non-Profit x Some Oversight 0.397 (0.492)
Non-Profit x Cash Monitoring 0.766∗ (0.402)
Proprietary x No Oversight -0.964∗∗ (0.430)
Proprietary x Some Oversight -0.896 (1.681)








Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(Konar & Cohen, 1997). Finally, DIVERSITY – or the proportion of an institution’s students who
are not an ethnic minority – captures the degree to which an institutions have the propensity to
use disclosed information (Decker et al., 2005; Teske et al., 2006). The expectation is that as
DIVERSITY decreases – or the proportion of white students decreases – institutions have less
incentive to respond to the FRCS program in a responsible manner.
A significant challenge of any empirical study comparing for-profit and non-profit institutions
– as it relates to the impact of a specific policy – is the problem of omitted variable bias and the
failure to model the mechanism of selection into the treatment or control groups. In the present
context, “selection bias” arises out of the unobserved characteristics affecting both the likelihood of
an institution being a for-profit institution and the response of an institution to the FRCS program.
Without accounting for the selection mechanism, an institution’s error term (εit) will be correlated
with explanatory variables and bias parameter estimates. As such, in addition to the fixed-effects
estimator y outlined above this study accounts for selection bias in three ways: a Heckman two-
step estimator for panel data, a doubly robust propensity score estimator, and instrumental variable
estimator. The appropriateness of each of these strategies, however, is a function of the treatment
effect of interest to the analyst.
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If an analyst is interested in estimating whether a treatment has an effect on the population to
which the treatment is applied – the average treatment on the treated (ATT) – propensity score
matching (PSM) or similar matching methods are the appropriate estimators. If, on the other hand,
the analyst is interested in the potential effects of a treatment when expanded to other units in the
greater population – the average treatment effect (ATE) – a Heckman-like model is appropriate
(Carley, 2012). Finally, if an analyst is interested in the effect of a treatment for units whose
treatment status is influenced by an exogenous characteristic – the local average treatment effect
(LATE) – an instrumental variables model is appropriate (Angrist & Imbens, 1994). Given the
interest of the present analysis in the impact of information disclosure as a policy instrument writ
large, discussion will focus on the ATE but estimates of the ATT and the LATE are also presented.
4.5.2.1 Heckman Correction
When applied correctly the Heckman correction is an unbiased estimator of potential outcomes
by modeling the systematic differences between groups (Carley, 2012). The Heckman correction,
however, has been applied almost exclusively to cross-sectional or pooled regression estimates,
posing an empirical challenge when it comes to panel estimation (Rochina-Barrachina, 1999).
In the present analysis, a Heckman-like correction is estimated by applying the logic of control
function approaches to endogeneity. The correction is applied in three steps: 1) estimate via a
probit model the likelihood of an institution being either a for-profit or non-profit institution, 2)
calculate the inverse mills ratio (λ ) for each observation, and 3) estimate the outcome equation
using λ as a predictor (Fernández-Val & Vella, 2011). This can be represented by the following
reduced-form equation:
∆Tuitionit = α0 +β1T REATit +β2SECTORit +β3(T REATit ∗SECTORit)
+β4Xit +β5(tUi)+di +dt +β6 [λ (SECTORit)−λ (−SECTORit)]+ εit (4.2)
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where λ is produced from the following probit model:
Pr(SECTORit > 0) =ϒ0 +Zit +dt +ds +νit (4.3)
where Z is a vector of institutional characteristics described above as well as indicator variables
representing whether individual institutions report their information separately or under one parent
institution. Well-documented among users of the Delta Cost Project, this variable satisfies the
“exclusion restriction” necessary to estimate a Heckman Correction Model. Similar to the logic
in identifying a valid instrumental variable, in the present analysis the exclusion restriction
necessitates a variable that is related to the sector of an institution while unrelated to changes
in tuition. As documented in the Delta Cost Project, for-profit institutions are more likely to report
their information under one “parent” campus than their non-profit counterparts (Jaquette, 2014;
Jaquette & Parra, 2016). The reporting variable also satisfies the second condition of the exclusion
restriction: the results of a Spearman rank correlation test find no evidence that grouped reporting
is related to changes in tuition levels. Results of the Heckman selection model are found in Table
4.3.
Table 4.3: Treatment Effect Estimates
ATT ATE LATE
Non-Profit x No Oversight Reference Category Reference Category Reference Category
Non-Profit x Some Oversight 0.861 (0.932) 1.084 (0.654) 1.839∗∗∗ (0.690)
Non-Profit x Cash Monitoring 0.805 (0.787) 1.782∗∗∗ (0.585) 3.394∗∗∗ (1.199)
Proprietary x No Oversight -2.986 (2.273) -1.901 (1.181) -1.869∗∗∗ (0.401)
Proprietary x Some Oversight -7.423∗∗ (2.923) -4.508∗∗ (2.088) -1.750 (1.153)
Ln(Grant) -0.486 (1.486) 1.575∗∗∗ (0.569) -0.782∗∗ (0.383)
Ln(Size) -3.288∗ (1.810) -0.978 (1.587) -0.173∗∗ (0.088)
Ln(Intensity) -0.574 (0.467) 0.025 (0.295) -0.024 (0.076)
Ln(Diversity) -1.986 (2.423) -0.224 (1.188) 0.139 (0.104)
Inverse Mills -3.084 (2.112)
Constant 40.083∗ (22.415) 5.117 (13.028) 9.295∗∗∗ (2.819)
N 6326.000 6305.000 3572.000
RMSE 7.675 5.464 5.706
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.5.2.2 Doubly Robust Estimates
Combining two approaches to estimating the causal impact of a treatment on an outcome of
interest, one possible doubly robust estimator combines traditional regression estimation with
propensity score reweighing. In order to derive the doubly robust estimator, an analyst first
estimates the propensity of an observation receiving a treatment and then reweighs the outcome
regression using the inverse of the conditional probability that an observation received said
treatment (Funk et al., 2011; Nicols, 2008). Whereas the outcome equation remains the same
as in Eq. (4.1) above, the outcome equation is now reweighed using the propensity score derived
from the following logit model where X is a vector of institutional controls as outlined above:
Pr(SECTORit > 0) = β0 +β1Xit +υit (4.4)
Although initially resembling the Heckman correction model outlined in Eq. (4.2) and Eq.
(4.3), there are notable differences between the two estimators. First, although doubly robust
estimators are – as the name suggests – robust to most forms of misspecification, the underlying
assumption of propensity score models is that the all differences between the two sectors are
observable (Jung & Pirog, 2014). In the instance that there are unobservable differences that
are not perfectly correlated with the observables, the propensity score model is misspecified and
the outcome regression will produce biased estimates. Unlike the Heckman correction, which is
biased toward zero, the direction of bias in propensity score models is unknown (Jung & Pirog,
2014; Vandenberghe & Robin, 2004). Additionally, while the Heckman model allows for an
examination of the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), doubly robust models estimate the average
treatment-on-the-treated (ATT). Whereas the ATE provides information on the effect of a treatment
when expanded to other units within the greater population, the ATT only provides information on
the impact of the FRCS program on Title-IV eligible for-profit institutions in the present sample
(Fortson et al., 2015). Given the interest in this study in speaking to the broader implications of
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information disclosure policies, the ATE estimates are preferred; the results of the doubly robust
estimators, however, are found in Table 4.3.
4.5.2.3 Instrumental Variable Estimates
Although both of the methods above address endogeneity in the systematic differences between
private for-profit and non-profit institutions, an additional potential source of endogeneity exists
in the form of the an institution’s FRCS being determined simultaneously with changes in tuition.
Given the potential of an additional source of endogeneity, the robustness of the above estimates are
checked by specifying an additional model using instrumental variable (IV) estimation. One of the
most common approaches to addressing endogeneity in policy analysis, IV estimation addresses
issues of endogeneity by using only part of the variability in an endogenous variable – the part
uncorrelated with the error term – to estimate the relationship between an endogenous regressor
and dependent variable (Angrist & Krueger, 2001; Cellini, 2008). The instrumental variable used
in this study are based on the the total executive and managerial employees of an institution. The
use of such an instrument is supported by the existing literature, which shows that management
size is linked to financial management practices (Dunn, 2004) and unrelated to tuition (Archibald
& Feldman, 2012). As such, the following equation was estimated using 2SLS:
T REATit = γ +λZit +θXit +ηit (4.5)
where Zit the total executive and managerial employees of an institution acting as an instrument
for the endogenous financial responsibility score of an institution. The predicted values of TREAT,
ˆT REAT are then used in the second stage regression equation to estimate:
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∆Tuitionit = α0 +β1 ˆT REATit +β2SECTORit+
β3( ˆT REATit ∗SECTORit)+β4Xit +β5(tUi)+di +dt + εi (4.6)
where aside from the predicted values of TREAT, the equation remains the same as the
originally specified. Results from the instrumental variables regression are found in Table 4.3.
4.6 Results
All four model specifications presented in Table 4.3 indicate a significant, differential impact of
the FRCS on the tuition setting behaviors of postsecondary institutions across various “doses” of
oversight and categories of financial responsibility. Across all four models, for-profit institutions
lower tuition costs when subjected to additional financial oversight and a “worse” label. The
magnitude of this difference, however, varies by the treatment effect of interest. Whereas the
ATE – or estimates derived via the Heckman correction – suggest that for-profit institutions lower
their tuition by approximately 4.7%, the ATTT – or estimates derived via doubly robust estimation
– suggest that for-profit institutions lower their tuition by approximately 7.4%. The difference
in magnitude, however, is expected: Heckman model produces estimates that are biased toward
zero (Puhani, 2000). Conversely, the LATE – or the estimates derived via instrumental variable
estimation – suggest that there is no statistically significant relationship between a for-profit
receiving a “worse” label and changes in tuition. Due to the properties of the different treatment
effects and the dangers of overestimating the impact of policies when conducting policy analysis,
the remainder of this study will focus on the ATEs as opposed to the LATEs or ATT (Currie, 2003;
Manski, 2011).3
3While there are dangers in underestimating the impact of policies, these dangers are typically associated with
the ethical ramifications of not implementing policies which may benefit some members of society. Given the focus
of this study is analyzing information provision from an economic viewpoint rather than an ethical one, the dangers
associated with wasting government resources is assumed to be of more concern (Bougherara et al., 2005).
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In addition to for-profit institutions decreasing tuition prices when labeled “financially
responsible but requiring additional oversight,” the average treatment effects indicate that non-
profit institutions increase their tuition by approximately 1.8% (p < 0.01) when faced with cash
monitoring and labelled “financially irresponsible.”4 Similarly, the LATEs support the ATE
estimates in suggesting that non-profit colleges receiving the “worst” label increase their tuition
by 3.39%. While these results are in opposition to the hypothesis stated above, the findings
are consistent with the broader economics literature that has yet to agree upon the differential
behaviors of non-profit and for-profit organizations in response to external pressures (Horwitz &
Nichols, 2007). Turning to institutional controls, only one variable is statistically significant in the
Heckman model: federal grant aid. Specifically, for each percentage increase in the amount of
federal grant aid received by an institution, tuition increases 1.5%. While not a large change, this
estimate finds support for the Bennett Hypotheses (Singell & Stone, 2007; Turner, 2014).
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
Evaluating the impact of information disclosure policies on the behaviors of regulated firms, this
study exploits the Department of Education’s Financial Responsibility Composite Scores, which
– in terms of an information disclosure policy – is a relatively aggressive measure. Not only
does an institution’s score convey information to potential consumers regarding an institution’s
financial behaviors, an institution’s score also dictates the amount of oversight an institution is
potentially subject to. Whereas many studies attempt to assess the effectiveness of information
disclosure policies they are often unable to establish a causal connection between consumer use
of information and the reaction of a firm to consumer use. Leveraging the FRCS alleviates this
limitation while also speaking to an under examined aspect of policy instruments: to what degree
are the impacts of information disclosure policies on regulated firms different between the for-profit
and non-profit sectors?
4The statistical difference across both sectors and “treatment groups” was determined using a Wald test of equality
of coefficients which yielded F = 4.29 and p < 0.01
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Results illustrate that both for-profit and non-profit institutions exhibit significant changes
in tuition prices: whereas for-profit institutions subject to additional oversight and a “poor”
score decrease tuition, non-profit institutions subject to oversight and a “poor” score increase
tuition. What remains unexplained however is what drives the differential impact of this specific
information disclosure policy across dosages and sectors. One possible explanation is the nature
of the FRCS as a policy instrument combined with the unique characteristics of postsecondary
markets – such as an institution’s stakeholders.
Predicated on the assumption that consumers (e.g. students and parents) can make informed
decisions about a good, information disclosure policies – as discussed – do not necessarily have to
be understood or utilized by the intended populations in order to have an effect (Goshorn, 1996)
First, even if individual consumers are not responding to information disclosure it can be assumed
that an institution’s executives are aware of an institution’s score and respond appropriately
(Decker et al., 2005). In the crudest sense, this may occur at the level of public relations
where executives will put pressure on lower-level administrators to respond to the ratings in a
manner that does not negatively influence their reputation (Craig et al., 2015). It is through
this concern for reputation to stakeholders – such as alumni and donors – that allows a second
process to occur: whereas prospective students may not possess perfect information regarding the
financial health of institutions, the reactions of institutions to information disclosure may signal
the information institutions wish to convey to consumers. In an overly heterogenous market – in
terms of both providers and consumer preferences – information asymmetries favor the providers
of an eduction over the consumers of an education (Vining & Weimer, 1988). In this second
process, the non-profit providers are at a distinct advantage over their for-profit counterparts: in
a sector where students serve as both inputs and outputs, non-profit institutions tend to serve a
relatively elite clientele with for-profit institutions representing the low-price/low-quality end of
the postsecondary market (Hansmann, 1987; Rothschild & White, 1993).
From the processes outlined above, for-profit institutions are more likely to suffer reputational
damage because of a lower FRCS. In the instance that a non-profit is sanctioned, the non-profit’s
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“trust capital” may buffer adverse effects of information disclosure; stated differently, there’s an
inherent trust among alumni and donors that financial decisions of non-profit institutions – such as
the raising of tuition – are necessary for a non-profit to successfully fulfill and pursue its mission
(Tuckman & Chang, 1992). For-profit institutions, however, are more likely to be perceived as
low quality when receiving a score that labels the institutions as financially irresponsible: even
when not labeled as financially irresponsible, for-profit institutions may signal a lower probability
of success and lower lifetime benefits to prospective students (Cellini et al., 2016). One way for
a for-profit to circumvent this reputational blow is to lower tuition costs in order to increase the
return on investment for students. To illustrate the effect of the FRCS on for-profit tuition levels,
consider the following expanded model of college choice outlined in the introduction and adopted
from Long (2004) and Cellini et al. (2016):
Ui j = α0(I(Xi)−P(Xi,Z j,S j))+α1A(Zi,S j,S− jc)+α2Di j + γXi + εi j
Where institutions are characterized by their expected out-of-pocket price paid by student Pi j
with prices varying both within and across institutions dependent on student characteristics Xi
(i.e. family income, academic ability) and college characteristics Zi (e.g. listed tuition, sector,
reputation). Therefore, institutions that are deemed financially irresponsible must then increase
a student’s utility (U) of selecting their specific institution ( jk). Whereas the time invariant –
or nearly time invariant – characteristics of institutions such as sector and reputation may buffer
institutions from the impact of a low score on an institution’s longterm reputation, a mechanism
through which for-profit institutions are are able to increase a student’s utility of attending is
by decreasing tuition. Put plainly: by decreasing tuition for-profit institutions are decreasing
the pecuniary costs of students attending their institution and thereby increasing the utility of
a student doing so. Conversely, in the non-profit sector a decrease in tuition would lead to a
perceived decrease in quality by specific stakeholder groups – an action that may have a larger
negative impact on the institution’s reputation than being labeled as financially irresponsible (Dills
& Rotthoff, 2013; Winston, 2000). While such behavior initially conflicts with the previously
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posited hypothesis, a for-profit institution’s primary goal is one of survival: when faced with the
treat of decreased enrollments and ceasing operations – as a result of the disclosed information
– for-profit institutions will lower tuition levels to attract students who may have otherwise not
enrolled in their programs. Although this assessment of college choice explains the reason for the
differential impact of information disclosure policies across sectors, this assessment does not fully
capture the degree to which the FRCS program is an effective policy instrument for correcting
information asymmetries.
Explicitly stating that one of the goals of the FRCS program is to protect consumers from
making a poor financial investment, estimates reveal that in light of regulation-through-information
policies, for-profit institutions decrease tuition levels. While this may signal an increase in the
return-on-investment to students such a response may exacerbate the information gap associated
with most information disclosure policies. Specifically, information gaps tend to be the widest
at the lowest rung of the socioeconomic ladder – a population served primarily by for-profit
institutions (Cellini, 2005; Teske et al., 2006). While the lowering of tuition may signal a greater
return on investment to students in choosing a for-profit institution, this effect has no impact on
the quality of or the risk associated with attending an individual institution; therefore, the market
is not corrected (Mocan, 2007). Although not intended to assess the quality of education with
an institution, the FRCS program may still influence the decisions of students who are shown to
make postsecondary enrollment decisions based on quality as well as cost – a relationship that is
highly differentiated across demographic groups (Perna & Titus, 2004). In the context of for-profit
institutions, the convenience of for-profit institutions often increases the utility of students more
than the quality of education they may receive (Iloh & Tierney, 2014). As such, these results hold
several implications for both postsecondary education policy as well as policy instrument design
broadly speaking.
First, the use of information disclosure policies must take into account the utility functions of
both consumers as well as regulated firms. In the case of for-profit institutions, the FRCS program
has the inadvertent effect of decreasing the tuition of attendance which results in a short term
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increase in the utility of students which may lead to long term welfare losses in the form of a
weak labor market. Second, while previous research has noted that increased public oversight –
similar to that embedded in the FRCS program – leads to more responsible financial management
practices in the non-profit sector, little research has examined the same call for accountability in
mixed-markets (St. Clair, 2016). Given that the results presented here display differential impacts
of information disclosure across the private sector, more research may prove fruitful. Finally, little
research on the impact of information disclosure policies has been conducted across policy realms;
with a vast majority of research taking place in the environmental policy realm. By assessing the
impact – or lack of impact – of such policies in the education domain, this study is able to paint a





“A very wide gulf separates the ethos of the policy analyst, who delights in insightful,
back-of-the-envelope calculations, challenges to the status quo, and the debunk of
dubious (and devious) partisan claims, from the detached, peer-reviewed ethos of
the scrupulous academic social scientist...” - Lynn 1999, p. 417
5.0.1 Summary of Dissertation
This dissertation consisted of three empirical studies examining the economics of for-profit
colleges and universities. Study one begins by examining the impact of for-profit colleges and
universities on the behaviors of existing community colleges within a specific higher education
market. With much of the extant research focusing on theoretical discussions of higher education
markets, study one empirically examines whether a specific aspect of higher education markets
exists and whether the existence of such market has any impact on the efficiency and/or
productivity of community colleges within that market. Utilizing Stochastic Frontier Analysis
and a Generalized Estimating Equation technique, study one illustrates that while the presence of
a for-profit college or university increases the efficiency of community colleges, such increases
in efficiency are either negatively or unrelated to degree productivity. Given the ongoing debate
surrounding the incentive structures embedded in government policies as it relates to increasing the
performance of public institutions of higher education, the results provided by study one also speak
to the larger debate surrounding the tradeoffs between input and output based funding structures.
Building off study one, study two explicitly examines the drivers of for-profit college and
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university entry and exit into local education markets. Positing that entry and exit decisions
are function of local market structures, study two dispels many of the widely-held assumptions
regarding for-profit colleges and universities targeting minority and disadvantaged communities.
With the results of study two being derived from one of the first substantive applications of the
split-panel jackknife, study two also illustrates the dangers of using naive estimators to produce
causal claims in policy research. Therefore, study two contributes not only to the substantive policy
aspect of this dissertation but to the methodological toolbox of policy analysts as well.
Whereas studies one and tow examined the macro-level environments in which for-profit
colleges and universities operate, study three explicitly evaluates the differential impact of
information disclosure policies on non-profit colleges and universities as well as for-profits.
Finding that being labeled with a “poor” financial responsibility score leads to non-profits
increasing their tuition and fees while for-profits decrease their tuition and fees, study three directly
speaks to the implications of the incentive structures embedded within regulatory policies. With
consistent results derived from several different treatment effect estimators that account for the
systematic, nonrandom differences between non-profits and for-profits, study three provides robust
evidence on the differential responses of for-profit colleges to government policies.
5.0.2 Limitations
As with all empirical studies, this dissertation possesses limitations. Some of these limitations
are theoretical and/or conceptual and some of these limitations are empirical. Not discussing such
limitations would be a disservice to both the dissertation itself as well as future research.
The major empirical limitation of this dissertation is the assumption of physicality. Stated
different: this dissertation assumes that for-profit colleges and universities are operating in a
physical space that creates competition. This assumption was made for one major reason: data
availability. Specifically, it is extremely difficult to find a valid measure of the degree to which a
for-profit college or university is operating online as opposed to in-person. At the federal level,
the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDs) does provide a distance learning
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Table 5.1: Student Enrollment in Online Courses
Institution Type All Courses Some Courses No Courses
Public, 4-year 11% 15% 75%
Public, 2-year 10% 18% 72%
Non-Profit 10% 8% 82%
For-Profit 34% 6% 60%
Source: McPherson & Bacow (2015)
indicator variable but this measure simply indicates whether distance learning is offered and not
the degree to which a for-profit college actually operates online. Additionally, this measure is not
limited to learning but includes video lectures as well as mailed materials. The measurement error
at the federal level is also reflected at the institutional level where there is a growing tend for online
course offerings across institutional types which is depicted in Table 5.1.
As illustrate by Table 5.1, approximately 34% of students in for-profit colleges and universities
take the entirety of their course work through online courses but approximately 60% of students
enrolled in for-profit colleges and universities do not take any courses online. Although the
percentage of students taking the entirety of their coursework online is higher at for-profits than
other institutional types, it is unclear how this distribution would impact the empirical estimates
presented in this dissertation. From a purely empirical perspective the estimates presented in
chapter two would be biased in the direction of those counties which offer large incentives for
online schools to operate out of those counties. Similar to how large credit card companies are
attracted to those states with appealing tax breaks, online-based programs would likely operate
out of areas where they have the financial incentive to do so.1 Future research would benefit
from identifying the areas in which online for-profit colleges operate and then adjusting empirical
specifications appropriately.
An additional empirical limitation of this dissertation also stems directly from one of the major
contributions: the application of sophisticated econometric techniques. Given the interest of this
dissertation in speaking directly to policymakers and possessing direct implications for policy,
1Of note: an institution’s enrollment must be at least 50% in-person for students to qualify for federal tax credits,
tax deductions, grants, loans, and other financial aid (Hoxby, 2017). Given the focus of this dissertation on for-profit
colleges and universities that receive federal financial aid, the assumption of some operational physicality is a safe one.
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the utilization of such econometric techniques may cause some of the major policy implications
to get lost in translation. Using study two as an example: while the split-panel jackknife is a
mathematically straightforward bias correction, the description of the correction itself is rather
technical. It was a hope of this dissertation that by applying the bias correction to a substantive
policy domain that the utility of such correction would become more obvious. With most of the
extant discussions of the split-panel jackknife being theoretical, future substantive applications of
the split-panel jackknife would be wise to continue working toward an easy-to-digest description
of the procedure itself.
Finally, some may see the reliance of a purely microeconomic framework as the major
limitation of this dissertation. As with adopting any particular framework, the researcher must
be aware of the various tradeoffs associated with the framework of their choosing. In the present
context, a microeconomic framework offers benefits in the form of assuming the existence of a
“market” due to the policy goals of the 1972 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1965.
Additionally, a microeconomic framework allows for an examination of the ways for-profits would
compete with other institutions through the specification of both individual and institution utility
functions: in order for an institution to compete for a student it must target a specific term of a
student’s utility function such as distance to home, cost, or programmatic offerings. The benefit
of utilizing a microeconomic framework, however, also comes at a cost: allocative efficiency
is assumed to take precedence over all other policy outcomes such as equity and effectiveness.
For illustrative purposes let us return to study one where the use of a microeconomic framework
allows for the explicit assumption of market existence, the impact of competition (even if only
through the threat of competition), and the exogeneity of enrollment patterns in community
colleges. Frameworks from traditional public administration, on the other hand, may make explicit
assumptions regarding the behavior of admissions officers as bureaucrats in helping enroll students
of similar demographics into their institutions. In the latter case, the model specified in study one
is both theoretically and empirically flawed; in the former (and present) case, the model specified
is both theoretically and empirically correct. And while a debate regarding the validity of specific
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frameworks is beyond the scope of this dissertation is important to keep in mind the assumptions
made by the theoretical framework chosen by a researcher and the facets of reality which are either
ignored or deemed less important. Recognizing the limitations if this dissertation that stem from
the selected framework, this dissertation hoped to avoid what Manski (2011) calls “the rhetoric
of science” by explicating the assumptions made within models based on the adopted conceptual
frameworks as well as recognizing what is outside of the scope of the frameworks utilized.
5.0.3 Contributions, Recommendations, and Next Steps
One of the primary purposes of this dissertation was the utilization of sophisticated yet appropriate
econometric techniques in the analysis of an over politicized policy domain – which in the current
context is for-profit higher education. Specifically, through the application of traditional policy
analytic techniques this dissertation represents a return to the scientific analysis of a specific
policy issue that is currently dominated by discussions void of empirical evidence. Just recently,
for example, discussions regarding the regulation of the for-profit sector have oscillated between
calling the sector “agile, disruptive, [and] Darwinian” and a sector that “dramatically falls short”
of its promise of providing students with an efficient route to career boosting credentials (Carroll,
2018; Hilliard & Chaban, 2018). Given the discussions throughout the dissertation regarding
the lack of empirical evidence for such claims, it is unknown as to which body of evidence
individuals are drawing on to make such statements. Additionally, the shear amount of similar
claims illustrates just how politicized the discussion surrounding for-profit colleges and universities
has become. It is such hollow claims that this dissertation attempts to tackle by providing some of
the first longitudinal studies of for-profit college and university behavior.
Utilizing stochastic frontier analysis – which allows for the possibility of inefficiency in the
error term – study one explicitly examines the efficiency of public organizations. By modeling
the relationship between the predictors and dependent variable for the most efficient observation
as opposed to the average observation, study one unpacks the existence of markets in higher
education. Given the ceaseless argumentative dialogue surrounding the existence as well as
74
impacts of education markets, study one provides robust empirical estimates of the positive
impact of markets on the efficiency of community colleges. Study one also illustrates, however,
the potential problems associated with markets operating in input based funding structures:
competitive forces lead to increased efficiency in terms of enrollment but have no positive impact
on productivity in the form of degree counts. Such findings also hold direct implications for
future policies: despite claims of opponents of performance-based funding policies who posit
that performance-based funding policies increase the perverse incentives of public organizations,
input-based funding structures also create a situation where institutions will enroll students who
they have no incentive of guiding through to completion. As such, policymakers must decide
between two second-best alternatives: either a system in which markets lead to increases in
enrollments but not in outcomes, or a system in which markets increase outcomes that may also
be accompanied by “cream-skimming” or institutions devoting resources to those who are the
“easiest” to guide through a completion agenda (Agasisti, 2009). Future analysis would benefit
from conducting a comparative analysis that directly examines the interaction of markets within
both input- and output-based funding environments to more explicitly speak to the possible welfare
losses associated with each funding environment.
While study two represents the application of a novel estimator – the split-panel jackknife – to
a substantive policy area – for-profit higher education – study two also tackles major assumptions
regarding the behaviors of for-profit colleges and universities. Finding that entry and exit decisions
of for-profit colleges and universities are a function of the local market structure as opposed to the
demographics of the individuals within that market, study two provides further evidence regarding
the degree to which markets may mediate many of the assumed behaviors of for-profit colleges
and universities. Additionally, study two illuminates the dangers of policy analysts in using naive
estimates to make causal claims regarding policy matters. In the context of study two, the estimates
provided by the naive estimator tell a story much aligned with the current, popular narrative
surrounding for-profit colleges and behaviors: that for-profit colleges and universities specifically
enter predominately minority and disadvantaged communities. The bias corrected estimators,
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however, tell the opposite story: for-profit colleges and universities are more likely to enter
predominately white, employed, civilian counties. Such a finding – while not surprising given the
lack of literature empirically testing this assumption – poses a challenge in terms of policymaking.
Given that study two presents results illustrating how for-profit colleges and universities are not
making entry and exit decisions, it may appear to skeptics and critics that this equates to advocating
for a lack of regulation on such entry and exit decisions. This is not the case. What is illustrated by
chapter two is that for-profit colleges and universities are looking to the existing market structure
as a signal as to whether they are capable of entering and successfully surviving within a market.
Future policies then would benefit from looking at whether such markets are leading to strong or
weak entrants (Ashiya, 2000). In the present context, a weak entrant would be a for-profit college
or university, which poorly operated and managed, then exits leaving individual students with a
meaningless degree or credential. In order to avoid such entrants future policies must strengthen
the existing public institutions who would then be strong enough to deter such weak entrants. One
possible mechanism through doing so is the increase in public subsidies and support – a proxy
for quality in a higher education setting where there is an absence of one objective performance
measure (Turner, 2003).
Finally, study three highlights the importance of policy instrument design. Finding differential
impacts of the same policy instrument between non-profit and for-profit colleges and universities,
the results of study three emphasize the need to take into account the incentive structures of
institutions. In the context of study three, the information disclosure policy analyzed assumes
the same incentive structure and student price elasticity regardless of institutional type – which as
the results of several treatment effect estimators illustrate – is an inaccurate assumption and leads to
differential institutional tuition changes. As discussed throughout the study, these results produce
direct implications for what is already perceived as the information gap in college decision making:
through lowering tuition for-profit colleges are most likely appealing to student bodies – such as
ethnic minorities – who while being influenced heavily by tuition in the college choice process also
misinterpret the real price of attending specific institutions (Perna & Titus, 2004; Perna, 2006).
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Given the findings presented in study three, any future regulations examining higher education
would be wise to design the policies in a manner which takes sectoral differences, such as the
student bodies they serve, into consideration. Similarly, as the Financial Responsibility Composite
Scores and other regulatory policies targeting for-profit higher education continue to age, it will be
same well spent to examine whether it is the threat of enforcement or actual enforcement of such
policies that leads to changes in institutional behavior.
All three of the chapters discussed contribute to several bodies of literature. First, all three
studies provide longitudinal, robust evidence on the behaviors of for-profit colleges and universities
which up to this point has remained unexplored by the extant literature (Jaquette & Parra,
2016). Through doing so the chapters provide policymakers with evidence regarding the for-
profit sector aside from labor market returns. Second, all three studies utilized sophisticated
econometric techniques applied to a specific policy domain. Through doing so the chapters provide
policymakers with robust evidence regarding these behaviors, explained in plain language that
can be easily understood without having to read proof-laden econometrics papers. Finally, this
dissertation hoped to remedy what some may see as a lack of traditional policy analytic work
by public administration scholars who, as remarked by one prominent scholar, often leave the
evaluation of public programs and policies to economists (Meier, 2005). With empirical, objective
research establishing causality between policy and outcomes lacking in the current political
environment, advancing such evaluative research is critical. As policy outcomes continue to draw
attention in perpetually resource-constrained, as well as an intellectually-adverse, political arena it
is the hopes of this dissertation to have long-lasting impacts in the field of public administration
and in shaping the knowledge to formulate policy and understand policy analysis broadly speaking.
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